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ABSTRACT
 
Large scale public science programs, particularly those
 
associated with the defense and space industries have grown
 
more expensive, both in terms of dollars and in human assets
 
since World War II. Many interacting variables have contri­
buted to the environment which forced these costs to increase
 
such as: each administration's perception of world events,
 
sudden shifts in program emphasis, increasing technical sophis­
tication, constant crises pressure, increasing costs, increas­
ing government-control and decreasing personnel morale.
 
In addition, emphasis in the social and economical en­
vironment of the Nation has shifted from defense and space to
 
the biosphere and the well-being of the individual. Therefore,
 
the objective of this paper is to propose a mechanism for re­
versing this trend toward ever increasing program costs.
 
Specifically, the proposition is that government contracting
 
agencies should become their own integrating contractor. The
 
primary reason for this proposal is to avoid the huge, long­
term contracts that have traditionally required the winning
 
contractor to hire great numbers of additional personnel only
 
to dismiss them again as their portion of the program is com­
pleted. Also, by contracting directly with subcontractors, the
 
government can reduce the compounding of overhead charges and
 
profit by each element of the program hierarchy.
 
Motivation for the project as well as some insights as
 
to the nature of the problem were derived from the author's
 
experience. Recent periodicals and management texts were the
 
v 
primary sources of information. Research to confirm the basic
 
causal factors also included a search of textbooks on recent
 
American history: Computer *technology was seen as a tool for
 
assisting in the accomplishment of future programs without
 
hiring massive, temporary staffs. Current status -and sugges­
tions for the utilization of these computers were obtained
 
from recent trade journals and by interviewing key management
 
personnel at the Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston Texas.
 
Course work for the Program for Advanced Study in Public
 
Administration, plus additional research, suggested that gross
 
disregard for basic human behavior characteristics has been
 
one of the major contribution factors to high program costs.
 
Consequently, a redefinition of the interface between the
 
responsible government contracting agency and the contractor
 
is proposed to help provide a working environment that is
 
conducive to increasing the self-esteem of both government and
 
contractor personnel.
 
In summary, this redefinition together with the proposi­
tion that government agencies become their own integrating
 
contractor are seen as reasonable, realistic means for reduc­
ing the cost of future large scale public science programs.
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CHAPTER I
 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT
 
Purpose and Scope
 
Several forces have been developing in the last few years
 
which are significantly changing the environment in which large
 
scale public science programs are managed. These forces are
 
the maturing of computer technology; the increasing tensions
 
between the government and defense and space to the biosphere
 
and the well-being of each individual; and the recent pressure
 
to reduce federal spending to curb inflation.
 
It is not possible to single out conclusively the contri­
bution that any one of these forces has made to the environ­
ment in which science policy makers now find themselves., Nor
 
can the contributions of any single force on future policies
 
and processes be anticipated without consideration of the
 
other major factors involved. Therefore, each of the forces
 
mentioned above will be described and its identifiable contri­
butions woven into the recommended management policies.
 
The objective of this paper is to propose a mechanism in
 
which computer technology and more attention to basic human
 
motivational factors cat be used to aid the administrators who
 
are attempting to relieve the dysfunctional tensions and to
 
accomplish the goals associated with their total environment.
 
Specifically, my proposition is:
 
Recent advances in computer technology will
 
permit large scale public science organizations
 
to become their own-integrating contractor with
 
the attendant-benefits of significant reduction
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in costs and improved personnel morale while
 
maintaining the required quality of the end
 
product.
 
Computer technology, like few other events in history,
 
has such ubiquitous application and is inducing such funda­
mental changes in the way society will conduct its routine
 
business that it must be considered to be one of the major
 
factors.
 
Today, we are dealing with machines that can
 
change society much more rapidly and profoundly
 
than the machines that accompanied the "Industrial
 
Revolution" of the late eighteenth and nineteenth
 
centuries because they deal with the stuff of
 
which society is made - information and its com­
munciation. I
 
One assumption upon which this paper is founded is that
 
economic and social pressures will force all levels of federal
 
program management, especially within the Department of Defense,
 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and their
 
contractors to eventually learn to use these tools. The tran­
sition can be painful and very costly or with careful planning,
 
discipline and a willingness to break with tradition, it can
 
be one of the best things that has happened. The objective
 
then is to make the transition as quickly, yet as painless and
 
as smooth as practical.
 
This assumption seems well supported by recent literature.
 
During the last year, the application of computer technology
 
to management function has been the subject of numerous arti­
cles in the Harvard Business Review, articles in the American
 
Diebold, John, Man and the Computer, Frederick A. Praeger,
 
Publishers, New York, 1969, p.4.
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Management Association pamphlets and innumerable articles in
 
the various trade journals. The following quotations, for
 
example, were taken from recent issues of the Harvard Business
 
Review:
 
The companies that will survive and prosper will
 
be the ones whose managers have mastered the
 
techniques of generating and using perceptively
 
the information that can be provided by data
 
banks. 2
 
For their well-being, all institutions in our
 
society, particularly industry and government,
 
must anticipate radical technological changes
 
that sweep aside existing practices and open
 
new opportunities - or create new problems.
 
The companies that neglect this task run a
 
serious risk.3
 
Fortunately, the use of computers has been central to an
 
.increasingnumber of functions in the defense industry for the
 
last twenty years. In the early 1950's, for example, computers
 
were absolutely necessary to compute accurate missile trajec­
tories. By the mid-1950's, a few complex hardware subsystem
 
performance programs were being used in the larger companies,.
 
During the last few years, computers have been utilized for._
 
the technical aspects of nearly every large hardware program.
 
However, their use as a management tool has just begun to be­
come operational in a few companies. The historical develop­
ment of computer technology and its utilization by defense
 
2Vandell, Robert F. "Management Evaluation in the Quantitative
 
World," HarvardcBusiness Review, January-February, 1970,
 
p.83.
 
3Bright, James R., 
"Evaluating Signals of Technological Change,"
 
Harvard Business Review, January-February, 1970, p. 62.
 
contractors is well documented and need not be comvered here.
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Discussion relative to computer technology will therefore be
 
limited to recent developments and to the applications proposed.
 
A frequently overlooked, yet essential variable related
 
to the application of computer related devices is the human
 
element.
 
Industry's greatest interest has been in the direction
 
of discovery, invention and mechanization, and will be
 
even more so now with the advent of automation. How­
ever---even in the most advanced form of automation, people
 
are necessary. And automation will demand increasingly
 
more and more from the men who are to build and control
 
the machine. 5
 
Development engineers have traditionally been poorly sat­
isfied, or self-actualized, by their work.6 This dissatis­
faction is particularly true in the defense industries.
 
Government procurement practices and industrial employment
 
practices have resulted in such job fragmentation that it is
 
difficult for the individual to identify with, or claim any
 
specific thing as his personal contribution to the program.
 
The reward structure is depersonalized. Working conditions
 
usually tend to further reduce individual identity by arrang­
ing large numbers of employees in what has traditionally been
 
called a "bull pen" or "on the floor", therefore morale tends
 
4
For example, see Berkeley, Edward C., The Computer Revolution,
 
Doubleday & Co., Garden City, New York, 1962.
 
5
Shefferman, Nathan, The Shefferman Personnel Motivation Pro­
gram, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1961,
 
1
p. .
 
6Pelz, Donald C. and Andrews, Frank M., Scientists in Organi­
zations, John Wiley and Sons, NeV York, 1966, p. 116.
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to be low and turn-over high. These conditions, added to the
 
feast-or-famine nature of the industry, present a formidable
 
array of negative motivators.
 
Even without the use of computers, program costs could
 
be reduced significantly and quality increased by providing
 
conducive environment and by arranging assignments such that
 
each employee would feel that he is important to the total
 
operation.
 
If we can solve the problem of human relations in
 
industrial production, I believe we can make as
 
much progress in the work cost as we made---through
 
the development of mass production.7
 
Therefore, improvement in the job satisfaction and self­
actualization of the individual worker is a major considera­
tion in each argument supporting my hypothesis.
 
This study is limited to a macro-view of the policies and
 
processes of a major development program as viewed from a
 
scientific field center of the Federal government. Specific
 
examples are used only to illustrate the concepts being pre­
sented. Although arbitrarily selected, these examples.are
 
hopefully realistic and reasonable.
 
Major Points in the Research Design
 
This paper is based primarily upon descriptive, socio­
logical research dealing with the development of forces and
 
with the interaction of groups; the impact of government in­
7Shefferman, 
p. 6.
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stitutions on social and economic welfare of the defense in­
dustries and the search for a better way of doing things.
8
 
The arrangement of the paper as well as the purpose and
 
primary research data source for each chapter is contained in
 
the following paragraphs.
 
Anguish in the Defense Industry9 -- My interest began as
 
a concern for the low employee morale and for the apparently
 
exorbitant cost of aerospace programs observed during several
 
years association with major government hardware programs. An
 
academic year devoted to graduate work in the Program for Ad­
vanced Study of Science Policy and Administration at The Univer­
sity of New Mexico has provided an excellent opportunity to
 
study all aspects of this situation. Regular course work
 
covered such germain subjects as the formulation of Public
 
Science Policy, Public Finance and the Budget Process as well
 
as both the historical and current thinking on Human Behavior
 
and Organization Theory. In addition, the academic environment
 
and facilities provided a unique opportunity to conduct spe­
cific research on the forces discussed herein.
 
The research procedure chosen required first a verifica­
tion that the low morale and high cost were widely recognized
 
as real concerns; also, that the factors postulated as import­
ant were common to the industry and not just associated with a
 
few specific programs.
 
8Dawe, Jessamon, Writing Business and Economic Papers, Little­
field, Adams & Co., Totowa, New Jersey, 1965, pp. 9-13.
 
9Title taken from Richard M. Anderson, "Anguish in the Defense
 
Industry," Harvard Business Review, November-Decertber, 1969.
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Periodicals were chosen as the primary source of data be­
cause they contain broader representation of opinions and much
 
more current thinking than is possible for even the most recent
 
books. Current data are considered to be important because the
 
equation for a solution must be based on the existing status and
 
the trends of the key variables. Findings and conclusions result­
ing from this phase of the research are contained in Chapter II.
 
Computer Technology -- Early in the research process, com­
puter technology emerged as a mechanistic device having suf­
ficient power and scope to serve as a means to improve the 
morale and cost picture. Research then shifted to determine 
the current status and trends of computer technology and utili­
zation. 
Since computers have been a basic tool for the defense 
industries for many years,, research was also required to de­
termine why computer technology had not already had the impact
 
on the program cost and personnel morale postulated by the
 
literature. The primary source for this data was recent
 
periodicals dealing specifically with computer technology and
 
its uses.
 
Personal interviews were also conducted with key personnel
 
at one government field operation, several aerospace contractors
 
and two major suppliers of computer hardware, software and utili­
zation services; These interviews were conducted to calibrate,
 
in a sense, the literature; that is, to determine if the impres­
sions obtained from the literature was consistent with actual
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utilization. The results of these studies are contained in
 
Chapter III.
 
Application of Computer Technology to Specific Program
 
Management Functions -- After determining the root causes be­
hind the high cost and low personnel morale of the defense
 
industry, and that computer technology has become operational,.
 
the next step was to show that computer technology can be in­
strumental in the treatment of these concerns.
 
First, existing and potential applications of computer
 
technology in specific hardware program management functions
 
are presented to facilitate an understanding of these func­
tions. Then, the effect that the use ofcomputers will have
 
on personnel requirements and policies is discussed. Data
 
for the discussion of the management functions and the speci­
fic application of computer tools thereto come largely from
 
the author's experience augmented by personal interviews with
 
key personnel in these functions at the NASA Manned Space­
craft Center, Houston, Texas. This discussion is contained
 
in Chapter IV.
 
Impact on Personnel and Organizations -- Research results
 
on basic human motivation and on how computer technology has
 
affected, is expected to affect and ought to affect personnel
 
,requirements, personnel policy and organizational structure
 
is contained in Chapter V. Foundation knowledge for this
 
selection was acquired in conjunction with the Program for
 
Advanced Study in Science Policy and Administration. Research
 
8
 
on specific points utilized both current periodicals and books
 
containing historical and current thinking on human motivation
 
and organization theory.
 
Government as its own Integrating Contractor -- Chapter VI
 
contains a logical development of the arguments to support the
 
hypothesis that the government should become its own integrat­
ing contractor. The model developed is highly normative in
 
that emphasis is on what ought to happed with no adjustments
 
for specific programs on specific government agencies. A
 
hypothetical program is invested to enable the discussion of
 
specific items thereby, hopefully, reducing the potential for
 
semantic confusion. Particular emphasis is on the demarca­
tion of roles between government agency and its contractors.
 
Conclusions and Summary -- The summary and conclusion
 
chapter contains first a brief restatement of the main points
 
discussed in each chapter, program management policies and
 
practices. Then, a set of normative policies and practices
 
are presented which are calculated to substantially reduce the
 
cost of large government hardware programs and greatly improve
 
the self esteem of the average employee involved with defense
 
industry.
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CHAPTER II
 
ANGUISH IN THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIES
 
The trend in the government's technique for managing large
 
defense programs has been to respond to ever increasing costs
 
with ever increasing control while at the same time requiring
 
the contractor to accept an ever increasing proportion of the
 
risk.1 This detailed control and heavy pressure is forcing
 
the defense industry, especially the prime aerospace hardware
 
contractors, to consider whether or not the risk of bankruptcy,
 
the health, home life and careers of many of its key personnel
 
and the "feast or famine" nature of the industry is worth the
 
reputed low average profit potential.
2
 
This situation did not just happen. When viewed in con­
text with major trends of the last twenty years, these condi­
tions are more understandable.
 
Background
 
The following review of the major events, or phases through
 
which the defense industry has passed during the last twenty
 
or so years,-is intentionally simplified to emphasize the
 
prominent trends.
 
Prior to 1941 -- Prior to World War II, weapon system pro­
curement was relatively simple and inexpensive. In the aero­
1 Drake, Hudson B., "Major DOD Procurements at War with Reality,"
 
Harvard Business Review, January-February, 1970, p. 119.
 
2 Ibid., p. 120.
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space industry, for example, a company would build a few proto­
type aircraft designed to meet a particular need of the Armed
 
Services. The service would test the aitcraft and if it fit an
 
existing need and was acceptable from an operations viewpoint,
 
the service would place an order for a number of aircraft on
 
essentially a fixed price basis. If the service decided that
 
they did not want or need the aircraft, the company would try
 
again. In this government/industry relationship, the govern­
ment performed two basic, distinct functions. It provided
 
several customers (each branch of the service) in the usual
 
marketplace sense of the word. And it provided technical as­
sistance to the entire industry at research centers such as
 
the NACA aerodynamic research and testing center at Langely
 
Field, Virginia. The government in its role as customer were
 
different agencies-than the government as technical advisor.
 
World War 1I: 1941 to 1945 -- During World War II, the
 
industry beganto change from a relatively small industry into
 
a giant. In a real sense, the industry exploded in an environ­
ment of schedule pressure and tight labor. To get enough good
 
people to do the job, the- industry hired anyone they could who
 
had even reasonable credentials in the hope of getting or
 
developing enough good people to get the job done. This be­
came a tradition.
 
Postwar: 1945 to 1948 -- After the surrender of Japan,
 
September 2, 1945, the United States could hardly wait to de­
militarize. Even though approximately one quarter of the work
 
force (8 million veterans and 3 million defense workers) were
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layed off in a nine month period, the transition was smooth. 3
 
Primarily because the general economy developed so rapidly to
 
satisfy the needs that had-accumulated during the war. How­
ever, the defense industry had the first four-year period of
 
famine.
 
Except for temporary increases at two points of
 
crisis, the gradualwhittling of the armed forces
 
continued, until by the spring of 1950 the army
 
was down to 600,000 men and the ceiling on defense
 
expenditure to $13 billion. 4
 
-Korean War: 1948 to 1953 -- During this period, aerospace
 
spending alone quadrupled, jumping from approximately $3 bil­
lion-per year to approximately $12 billion per year in 1953.5
 
Cost was secondary to schedule and technical development. .In
 
addition, most defense contracts were of the cost plus fixed
 
fee type in which profit was a fixed percentage of the total
 
program cost. Therefore, each company was motivated to hire
 
as many people as they could. In addition, schedule pressure
 
was at crisis level. Engineers were in such great demand that
 
any reasonably qualified person could find a job.
 
Postwar: 1953 to 1957 -- In 1953 a movement began to re­
duce military expenditures. A "new look" in defense policy was
 
formulated in which it was decided that the United States would
 
3Fishman, Leslie, Allen, Jay, Bunger, Byron and Eaton, Curt,
 
Reemployment Experiences of Defense Workers, Report No.
 
ACDA/E-113, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
 
1968.
 
4Williams, T. Harry, Current, Richard H., 
and Freidel, Frank,
 
A History of the United States: Since 1865, Alfred A. Knopf,
 
New York, 1965, p. 673.
 
5
"Growth Trends: U. S. Aerospace Industry," Aviation Week and
 
Space Technoloqv, March 9, 1970, p. 22.
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rely on thermonuclear weapons delivered by the Air Force. Army
 
.ground forces, unproven missile research and other basic-scien­
tific research were all greatly reduced. Overall defense ex­
penditures were reduced by 10 percent.6 The defense industry
 
had its second four years of famine. Less than one-tenth the
 
number of 'the veterans and defense contractors laid off after
 
World War II were involved in the post Korean transition.
 
However, there was no corresponding accumulation of civilian
 
needs. Therefore, in spite of continued defense spending, in­
tensive use of the GI bill, and a healthy economy, the personal
 
incone loss from production was more than double the post World
 
War II loss.7
 
Arms Race: 1957 to 1961 -- In August 1957 Russia launched
 
its first successful ICBM. In October, 1957, it placed its
 
first satellite into orbit. President Eisenhower devoted al­
most the entire 1958 annual State of the Union address to Con­
gress to the armament crisis. He called for heavy additional
 
expenditures for missiles and for submarines and cruisers that
 
could carry these missiles. 8 Although it was a feast period
 
for the missile and ship building industries, it was extended
 
famine for the aircraft manufacturers. The prevailing attitude
 
at the time was that military aircraft would be totally replaced
 
by missiles. Even so, by 1961, defense was really big business
 
directly employing 3-1/2 million people and requiring half of
 
the Federal Budget.
9
 
6Williams, p. 749- 8Ibid., p. 762 
7Fishman, p. 229. 9 Ibid, p. 787 
13 
Defense contractors became notorious for exceeding contract
 
costs. Mr. Richard M. Anderson suggested that Congress, the
 
contracting agencies-and the private contractors each contri­
butedito an environment within which cost excesses were inevita­
10
 
ble.1 Both the contractors and the agencies for which they
 
were preparing cost and schedule estimates tended to le opti­
mistic. They were afraid that if they told Congress what they
 
really thought the program.would cost, Congress would not ap­
prove the funds. 11 The problem was further complicated because
 
the contractors-did not maintain realistic PERT and other trend
 
charts considered to be essential for good management to avoid'
 
revealing the true situation too soon. By the time the prob­
lems became obvious, sunk costs were so great that the program
 
would probably not be cancelled.12  This lack of sound manage­
ment practices, of course, caused even further cost increase
 
and schedule slippage.
 
The Kennedy Years: 1961 to 1963 -- President Kennedy and
 
Secretary McNamara built their defense plans upon the theory
 
that the strength of thermonuclear weapons on the part of both
 
the United States and Russia was sufficiently great to constitute
 
a mutual deterrent against war. They also favored a broad
 
range of options as opposed to President Eisenhower's reliance
 
on an all-out nuclear attack. Again the distribution of
 
defense funds shifted. Again hundreds of thousands of families
 
had to iove to follow the business.
 
1 0Anderson, p. 168. 1 2Ibid.
 
11- p 5Williams, p. 787.
 Drake, p. 125. Wlias .77
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In addition, President Kennedy asked Congress to set a
 
goal of landing men on the moon and returning them safely be­
14
fore the end of the decade. The newly created NASA and its
 
contractors began urgent staffing. Again there was little time
 
and little incentive to be overly concerned with selecting the
 
best people, or with saving money. Total employment by the
 
NASA and its contractors grew from approximately 50,000 in
 
1961 to over 400,000 in 1965.15
 
Problems of another kind began for the industry in 1961
 
when Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara began to try to get
 
the defense industry on a more business-like financial posture.
 
Much of the defense spending during the Korean War and the Cold
 
War arms race was for new technology on a tight schedule.
 
Therefore, cost plus fixed fee contracts were used. Secretary
 
McNamara was convinced that this type of contract for large
 
military hardware procurements was much too expensive. Ee
 
initiated several changes; greater emphasis on planning prior
 
to contract award, the Total System Concept and incentive con­
16
tracts. After decades of operating in an environment in which
 
money, for all practical purposes was no object, these changes
 
ran into considerable difficulty. Unfortunately, the remainder
 
of the Department of Defense-and the contractors could not
 
change old habits and procedures that quickly.1 7 The only real
 
-14Ibid., p. 788.
 
15Normyle, William J., "Limited Funds Defer Manned Programs,"
 
Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 9, 1970, p. 67.
 
16Williams, p. 788.
 
17Drake, pp. 123-124.
 
15
 
change was a tremendous increase in cost and paper work. The
 
contractors still responded with what they thought the agencies
 
wanted to-hear rather than with realistic estimates.
 
In addition, the "total system" plan was initiated in an
 
attempt to make the prime, or integrating contractor do a bet­
ter job of planning by making him responsible for every aspect
 
of the system being procured from initial design to operational
 
support. This concept has proven to have several disadvantages.
 
a) The incentive contracts required implicitly that the
 
contractors be able to predict the cost of solving unknowns
 
many years in advance. This has proven to be unrealistic be­
cause of the unanticipated unknowns that always arise early in
 
testing phases. Nor was the implementation of this concept
 
realistic. Several of these "total system" contracts are so
 
large that if the contractor guessed wrong, or managed poorly,
 
18
 
penalties could bankrupt the company several times over.
 
b) Another difficulty has been the government's desire
 
to make changes. Schedule pressure and rapid technological
 
1 8Ibid., p. 124. One particularly significant example is Lock­
heed Aircraft Corporation. According to Barry Miller, "Com­
plex Problems Hit Lockheed," Aviation Week and Space Tech­
nology, March 30, 1970, pp.. 56-57, "If one single factor
 
could be isolated and identified as the root cause of the
 
companies financial woes, it would be the concept of total­
package procurement and the controversial interpretation and
 
administration it allowed." Although Lockheed has a backlog
 
of over five billion dollars, three of its large defense pro­
grams are total-package, fixed price contracts that are in
 
trouble. Lockheed's net worth is reported to be approximately
 
$340 million and the loss from these programs could exceed
 
$600 million.
 
16
 
developments forced the armed services and the NASA to combine
 
the role of "customer" with the role of "technical advisor" to
 
do everything possible to get the systems operational as soon as
 
possible. Unfortunately, by combining the roles of customer and
 
technical advisor, the government essentially removed technical
 
responsibility from the contractor. Informal "suggestions" as
 
well as formal directions were issued by the government special­
ists on virtually every element of the system being developed.
 
Thus, if the contractor so chose, he could claim that he had been
 
directed to do almost everything. These changes were very ex­
pensive in both dollar cost and personal morale.
 
This tendency to change the contractor's design is particu­
larly onerous in the early development phase before formal con­
figuration control has become effective. Any government design
 
engineer could write a letter of technical direction to the con­
tractor changing requirements or telling him how to design a
 
particular part. Of course, these letters were not official un­
til signed by the appropriate contracting officer. However, it
 
was very difficult for these contracting officers to know if
 
these changes were really needed, or simply a different way of
 
doing the same thing. Since the engineer working for the govern­
ment represents the customer, he usually got the benefit of the
 
1 9
 
doubt.
 
c) Cost is significantly increased by the compounding of
 
profits and overhead charges for tiers and tiers of subcontractors
 
19This observation is based on several years experience in the
 
Apollo Program Office and verifidd by explicit conversation.
 
with NASA contracting officers.
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and vendors. Each level's profit and overhead charges include
 
a percentage of the total cost of the tiers below. For ex­
ample, the following case was noted by the March 31, 1964,
 
McClellan Report prepared by the Senate Committee on Govern­
ment Operations:
 
One instance they noted involved pyramiding through
 
three tiers; (1) the producer of the article; (2)
 
the subcontractor, and (3) the prime contractor to
 
the government. They found that the original pro­
ducer's bill was $53.8M, including 9.2% profit.
 
The subcontractor tacked on a modest profit of 6.8%
 
and billed the prime $57.5M. .The prime tacked on
 
G&A of $2.1 and a modest profit of 5.9% and billed
 
the Government $62.9M - the difference in cost from
 
producer to the user-over $9M, and total profits
 
over .$11M- One might logically suggest that this
 
profit pyramiding was appropriate because of the
 
effort input by the succeeding tiers. However,
 
the costs for any such effort is not included here.
 
These costs were reimbursed separately and profits
 
added.2 0
 
Vietnam and Apollo: 1963 to 1969 -- As the urgency of the
 
Cold War began to subside, Vietnam, the Apollo program and pres­
sure for domestic needs began to increase. Demand gradually
 
increased for conventional weapons; i.e., rifles and bombs as
 
well as new weapons especially designed for the non-structured,­
jungle environment of Vietnam action. Aircraft orders doubled
 
,from approximately 13 billion to 2.5 billion between 1964 and
 
1966, then began decreasing almost as rapidly as it had grown.
 
Missile orders dropped from 1.6 billion to approximately 1.0
 
billion in 1965, then increased gradually to 1.3 billion in
 
2 0Lang, Dave, "Profits," NASA Procurement Countdown, Vol. 25,
 
December 1969.
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211968 before starting down again. Again, countless thousands
 
of people were hired only to be fired a few years later.
 
Summary of Historical Influence
 
When viewed from the taxpayers point of reference, the de­
fense industry has been an ever-increasing monster. Except for
 
brief post-war periods, expenditures have climbed from the be­
ginning of the Korean War until 1969. Each major increase was
 
forded by a specific world event that required crisis response.
 
For the most part, anyone could get a high paying job whether
 
they were good-workers or not. However, a very large percent­
age had to plan to move every four or five years as emphasis
 
shifted on the type of weapons needed. These moves are very
 
expensive for the government and for the employee. As a rough
 
estimate, the personal economic loss averaged one half of one
 
year's salary per move per family.2 2 For the individual it
 
also meant leaving friends, uprooting families and starting
 
over in another house or another job with no seniority. It
 
was not unusual for an employee having several years experience
 
to move, as he had done before, when business began to decline.
 
This technique in the late 1960's, however, frequently resulted
 
in the employee finding himself without a.job in a few months
 
21Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 9, 1970, p. 23.
 
22Fishman, p. 226.
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as the new job began to cut back and he no longer had thepro­
tection of seniority.
2 3
 
Individual companies were in a constant crisis environment.
 
They were either urgently preparing proposals for new business,
 
*staffing and working under great schedule pressure when the
 
winds of fortune turned their way or regrouping and reducing
 
staff under great financial pressure when the wind turned away.
 
The Current Environment
 
The environment in which the defense industry operates
 
is changing again. The nation's top priority is shifting from
 
defense and space to the biosphere and the well being of the
 
individual. These-changes are, in turn, causing the emphasis
 
within the aerospace Industry to shift from schedule considera­
tions to cost considerations.
 
Financial
 
Since 1968, procurement obligations for military .aircraft
 
and NASA spacecraft have decreased by more than five billion
 
24
 
dollars. This is equivalent to 400,000 employees that were
 
forced to leave the aerospace industry alone, not counting other
 
defense industries.25 In addition, contractors are spending
 
23One of the author's personal acquaintances working at North
 
American Rockwell was laid off in spite of the fact that his
 
management considered him to be one of their better engineers.
 
It had been his fourth job in two years simply because he had
 
no seniority in a declining economy. He went into the grocery
 
business.
 
2 4Aviation Week and Space Technology, Mary 9, 1970, pp. 25, 
65. 
25 '" man, p. 234. 
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hugh amounts of money on commercial aircraft development and
 
.preparation for new DOD and NASA contract proposals% As a re­
sult, aerospace contractor debt is skyrocketing. Total debt
 
has risen from approximately $1.2 billion in early 1966 to ap­
26
proximately $5 billion in early 1970. Many contractors are
 
finding it increasingly difficult to obtain operating capital.
 
Several articles have appeared in leading financial and
 
management periodicals suggesting that the government change
 
its contracting policies and become more generous with the
 
maximum profit it permits defense contractors to earn. For
 
example, Hudson Drake, Director of the President's Commission
 
on White House Fellows and consultant to the President's ad­
visory council on executive organization for science and tech­
nology (from North American Rockwell Corporation) writes:
 
According to the Federal Trade Commission's financial 
report for Manufacturing companies [1968], the aver­
age profit on sales for all manufacturing companies 
is 5.1% and the same average for aerospace companies 
is only 3.2%. . . Given the -actual 3.2% profit level, 
it is not surprising to see companies that have hither­
to relied heavily [or almost exclusively] on advanced 
system contract work moving toward the greener pastures 
of the commerical market place. 2 7 
Profit as a percentage of sales is not a particularly
 
meaningful parameter -for comparing the average aerospace com­
panies profit to the average profit earned by the majority of
 
manufacturing companies because of the differences in capital
 
2 6Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 9, 1970, p. 32.
 
27Drake, p. 120.
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investment. Most manufacturing companies operating in the
 
commercial market place own their facilities, machinery; and
 
other equipment. Defense contractors, on the other hand, uti­
lize government owned buildings, tools, test equipment and
 
even office furniture for most of their defense work.
 
Defense profit on total capital investment has declinec
 
during the last ten years from approximately 11% in 1958 to
 
6.8% in 1968. During the Same time period, profit on this
 
same basis for non-defense oriented firms increased from 7.5%
 
in 1958 to 10.2% in 1968. For the last several years:
 
Defense-oriented companies reporting high probit­
ability have been considerably less profitable than
 
high-profit non-defense firms. At the same time,
 
those defense-oriented firms reporting low profit­
ability have also been less profitable than low­
28
 profit non-defense firms.
 
Personnel
 
As in the past when a particular company's business be­
gan to decrease, the company would quickly cut back personnel.
 
This time, however, the business slowdown is industry wide.
 
Deescalation in Vietnam and strong public pressure have reduced
 
military spending. Completion of the initial lunar landing mis­
sion and the usual pause between major programs have reduced
 
space spending. Anti-inflation policies and pressure from a
 
cooling economy have reduced commercial aircraft spending. Con­
sequently there is no place for employees that have been laid
 
off to go.
 
2 8Aviatioa Week and Space Technology, May 4, 1970, p. 55.
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Although statistics are not available for the entire de­
fense industry, the decline in manpower for the NASA programs
 
alone indicate the magnitude of the problem. Between early
 
1966 and 1970, NASA total employment fell from over 400,000 to
 
29
 
approximately 175,000.
 
A 	recent newspaper article showed that between 30,000 and
 
40,000 aerospace industry employees were laid off in the city
 
30
 
of Los Angeles, California, alone during 1969.
 
These figures are presented for two purposes. First, as
 
explicit examples of how even a mild economic dip affects per­
sonnel employment in the aerospace industry. The second rea­
son is to introduce the suggestion that future lay-offs of
 
this magnitude can be significantly reduced by utilizing com­
puter technology to conduct the routine, detailed work and
 
.thereby avoid the overstaffing that has become so characteris­
tic of the industry.
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Bigness vs. Profitability

A new dimension is entering the environment in which the
 
giant defense contractors operate. In a recent analysis of
 
the relative profitability of large and small companies, Mr.
 
Fred R. Wittnebert found that-rapidly changing markets, the
 
technological explosion, public and employee attitudes,
 
29 Ibid., p. 67
 
30	 
"Aerospace Industry Layoffs Hit Skilled," Albuquerque Journa±
 
March 15, 1970.
 
Wittnebert, Fred R., "Bigness vs. Profitability," Harvard
 
Business Review, January-February, 1970, p. 158.
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competition and other factors are making it increasingly dif­
ficult for big business to compete with smaller, more flexible,
 
organizations. "Contrary to popular opinion, big business is
 
no longer much more profitable than small business." 32 Since
 
-1960, big companies have been losing ground rapidly. In fact,
 
many have already fallen behind smaller competition in some
 
respects.
 
Many factors are involved in this equalization:
 
Working Capital -- Smaller companies find working capital
 
more readily available. This is partly because they do not re­
quire the hugh amounts sought by the industrial giants and
 
partly because the United States has a tradition of helping
 
smaller businesses.
 
Response Time -- Smaller companies can respond much more 
rapidly-to new knowledge. Large organizations tend to be much
 
slower because there are so many more people to inform. So
 
many more levels of approval are required and frequently so
 
many more ponderous organizational elements must analyze the
 
situation before new knowledge can be utilized.
 
Research by Dr. Rensis Likert verified the considerable
 
time required for policy changes to become fully operational
 
and to become effective throughout an organization. Two time
 
related changes are shown by Dr. Likert. The first is the
 
time delay from the time top management starts a new policy
 
until the subsequent levels start. The other is the gradual
 
:Ibid.
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increase (or decrease) in skill after initiation of the change.
 
-The changes for which the following figures were derived were
 
for implementation of new management techniques which might re­
quire somewhat-longer to absorb than other technical changes.
 
Howeyer, they do suggest the time lag between levels-and the
 
time between generation of an idea and its incorporation into
 
hardware.
 
Time after
 
initiation, months
 
Management's knowledge 0 
Management's skills 3 
Management's behavior 6 
Attitudes, performance goals, motivation, 
communication 9 
Turnover, absence 15 
End results: productivity 12 
End items quality 15 
Steady gains in each category were also shown for over
 
two years after the initiation of the changes.
33
 
Computer Utilization -- Time sharing of computer facilities
 
has also eliminated one,of the previous advantages Held by large
 
companies. During the 1960's only large companies could afford
 
34
to use computers. Not only because small firms lacked-enough
 
business to fully utilize a computer, but even more important,
 
33Likert, Rensis, The Human Organization, McGraw-Hill Book Com­
pany, New York, 1967, p. 92.
 
34Wittnebert, p. 160.
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they could not afford to maintain one staff to do business the
 
old way and another staff of computer specialists to develop
 
the programs needed for their specific applications.
 
Now many time sharing networks have been established by
 
enterprising companies to provide computer facilities to small
 
users at greatly reduced cost per client. Firms offering parti­
cipation in these time-sharing networks also frequently provide
 
a library of programs to ineet the needs of their clients.
 
Public Hostility -- One factor discovered by Mr. Wittnebert
 
is the increasing effects of public hostility toward business
 
in general. According to Mr. Wittnebert, the "have-nots" pos­
sess a warped perspective of the role payed by industry and
 
profit in the well-being of the individual. The "haves" pos­
sess a disdain for the tools of abundance and even for industry':
 
increasing awareness of their social responsibility. 35
 
These objections are aimed at industry.in general. How­
ever, small companies have the advantage of showing a low pro­
file. They are therefore much less susceptible to moralistic
 
objection, negative propaganda,-labor coercion, political pres­
sure, economic boycott and trade restraint.36
 
Personnel -- As computer systems use increases the average
 
level of personnel intelligence increases as technicians and
 
other -personnel who were involved in routine operations are
 
35Ibid.
 
36Ibid.
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replaced by more highly trained professionals. Intelligent
 
people tend to have a broader view and want greater participa­
tion and self-actualization.. The long, tortuous ladders of
 
large organizations make it very difficult for the ambitious
 
young manager to reach the levels where he has sufficient con­
trol over his functions to feel effective. Therefore, many of
 
the best minds prefer to work for small companies where they
 
have greater influence.
37
 
Development engineers have long disliked their treatment
 
by large companies. A recent survey showed that development
 
engineers are second only to production line workers in lack
 
of self esteem and consequently low morale.3 8 They are usually
 
in "bull pens," given dull, routine work for years before given
 
significant responsibility and frequently receive the same
 
raises as their peers whether they work hard or do nothing.
 
Small companies usually cannot afford such gross under-utili­
zation of their skilled personnel. However, small firms are
 
frequently not even considered by job hunting defense engineers
 
because the small firms also show a low profile to perspective
 
employees. They cannot afford the extensive advertising cam­
paigns, so commonly conducted by the giants during periods of
 
rapid personnel build-up.
 
3 7Ibid, p. 163.
 
38Pelz, Donald C. and Andrews, Frank M., Scientists in Organi­
zations, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1966, p. 116.
 
27
 
SUMMARY
 
Conditions causing the anguish in the defense industry
 
have been building since World War II and therefore have be­
come traditional. The primary cause seems to have been the
 
inability of the Federal Government to maintain a uniform de­
fense plan in which changing world situations are anticipated
 
in time to permit gradual transitions. As a result, the
 
government induced management by crisis. An international
 
event would occur, or a new administration would interpret the
 
country's needs differently and a sudden, major change of
 
policy would result. One faction of the defense industry
 
would be turning every rock to find personnel. Another faction
 
would be laying off employees by the thousands.
 
Government agencies assigned the responsibility for im­
plementation of these programs were also under heavy schedule
 
pressure. Therefore, they in turn responded by increasing
 
pressure and control over their contractors. This interfer­
ence increased schedule pressure and frequent program changes
 
directed by the government increased the cost, in both dollars
 
and personnel well being, to the point that several of the
 
industrial giants were beginning to deemphasize the government
 
research and development business.
 
*These practices also resulted in a greatly inflated man­
power supply because every incentive (schedule pressure, pro­
fits, ability to respond to proposals and the development of
 
computer technology) favored increasing technical staff.
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Fluctuations in the industry were hard on personnel in that
 
many were forced to move every four or five years. Most could
 
usually find jobs but at an average cost of half a year's salary
 
per move.
 
In 1969, however, several of the forces driving the de­
fense industries' fourtunes began to turn down at the same time;
 
the Apollo program, the Vietnam War, total government spending
 
to combat inflation as well as the increase in the cost of
 
working capital. As before, defense industry contractors began
 
to unload their surplus technical staffs. This time, however,
 
there is no place for these people to go.
 
Aerospace industry giants that have ample business are
 
having a very difficult time with a new set of problems. The
 
"total package" concept introduced by Robert S. McNamara re­
quired an accurate long range anticipation of costs that these
 
companies were not'capable of performing. As a result, many
 
are locked into fixed price, incentive fee contracts for which
 
both the extent of inflation and technical problems were badly
 
underestimated. Incentive penalties are enough to bankrupt
 
the companies. In addition, the general economy slowdown has
 
seriously affected their commercial business.
 
Another new factor in an increasing unfavorable environ­
ment for industrial giants; public attitude agains industrial
 
profits, industrial contamination of the biosphere, tight money
 
and the equalization effects (vis-a-vis small businesses) of
 
computer time sharing and rapid response to changes.
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-It is much too late for new policies and processes made
 
possible by maturing computer technology to aid in the crisis
 
that is now developing. However, this crisis will probably
 
force more than a million people out of the industry (approxi­
mately 400,060 were forced out in 1969 alone). The objective
 
now is to develop a mechanism for keeping the number of people
 
in the industry down to reduce the susceptibility of the in­
dustry to these feast or famine cycles in the future.
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CHAPTER III
 
-COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
 
Utilization of technological developments frequently pro­
ceeds in a series of jerks and leaps. Early in the innovation
 
period, exaggerated claims are followed by disillusionment,
 
general pessimism and skepticism. Then, after a reasonable
 
period of development and learning, many, if not all, of the
 
early "ridiculous" exaggerations and expectations are greatly
 
-exceeded.
 
For many managers their last serious contact with com­
puters was during the period of disillusionment, general pes­
simism and skepticism when computer utilization was limited to
 
a few routine administrative bookkeeping functions and engi­
neering computations. Business and management periodicals are
 
now predicting that these managers will soon be unable to com­
pete with companies that have been aggressively adapting these
 
tools to their business needs. In January-February, 1970,
 
Harvard Business Review, for example, Robert F. Vandell argues
 
that the long promised wonders of the computer for management
 
purposes has finally established a firm base and is now forc­
ing a management revolution:
 
The quantitative revolution is already under way
 
in some leading industries.- Its first fruits are
 
beginning to exert broad effects on competition
 
LKahn, Herbert and Wiener, Anthony J., 
The Year 2000; A Frame­
work for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years, The
 
MacMillan Co., London, 1967, p- 93.
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that will force other companies to adapt the new
 
methods rapidly. 2
 
The objective of this chapter is to give the reader an in­
dication of the immense capability now available to program
 
managers and to explain why computer technology is now ready to
 
support industrial management when it was not just a few years
 
ago. 
Computer Utilization
 
The idea for an automatic machine that would add, subtract,
 
multiply and divide in a sequence of steps automatically was
 
conceived in 1812 by Charles Babbage, a professor of mathema­
tics at Cambride University, England. He intended to use the
 
machine tocompute mathematical tables. Unfortunately, the
 
precision tooling, mechanical and electrical devices necessary
 
to make the machine were not available until nearly a hundred
 
years later.3
 
And so it has always been. A resourceful, imaginative
 
man had a routine task to accomplish, each element of which was
 
adequately understood, but the sheer bulk of work required was
 
too great without tools that technology had yet to provide.
 
In 1886, statistician Dr. Herman Hollerith was still try­
ing to summarize United States census data taken six years
 
2Vandell, Robert F., "Management Evolution in the Quantitative
 
World," Harvard Business Review, January-February, 1970, p.92.
 
3.
Berkeley, Edmund C.,. The Computer Revolution, Doubleday and
 
Company, Inc., New York, 1962, p. 32.
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before. He decided to experiment with cards with punched
 
holes in them and electrical devices to detect and count these
 
holes. The idea came from the Jacquard loom that had been
 
using punched cards for controlling the weaving pattern for
 
at least eighty years. Hollerith's experiments and machines
 
were successful and led to a great development of punched
 
card machines for business, accounting and statistical pur­
4
 poses.
 
At the Bell Laboratories in New York in 1939, Dr. George
 
R. Stibitz was bothered with a log of complex arithmetic cal­
culations for analy ing alternating electrical circuits. So
 
he wired up ordinary telephone relays, representing each deci­
mal digit by a code of ones and zeroes. Stibitz's "Complex
 
Computer" performed computational chores for many years until
 
replaced by more powerful equipment.5
 
Numerical computations required for the Atomic Bomb in
 
the mid 1940's, and missile trajectories in the early 1950's
 
would have been impossible without these computational tools.
 
Even with these tools, years were required to develop suffic­
ient computer software to permit the accurate simulations re­
quired.
 
During the next decade, the computer became recognized as
 
the tool for taks in which:
 
Large amounts of information needed to be stored,
 
added or processed.
 
4Ibid., p. 35.
 
5Ibid.
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A large number of interacting variables must be
 
related or analyzed before a problem can be
 
solved.
 
Repetitive activities exist for which the deci­
sions can be made more or less automatically by
 
a computer model.
 
Accuracy is important or useful.
 
Cost per unit of data output shouid be low.6
 
For many managers in the defense industry, the last de­
cade has been maddening. As personnel at all levels became
 
aware of the computer's ability to do their routine and tedious
 
work for them, resourceful, imaginative ien would want to drop
 
everything and develop a program to do this work. But tech­
nology had been unable to keep up with the demand. As amazing
 
as the development of computer technology-has been, it was not
 
good enough. Computers were too slow, too expensive and too
 
small to satisfy what the users wanted to do.
 
Even if computer facilities were available, it took longer
 
to develop a program to use the computer to solve a complex
 
problem than to divide the problem into steps for which pro­
grams were available and have them computed separately. This
 
technique frequently required weeks before the total problem
 
was solved. Programs had to be modified slightly. Runs could
 
only be made at night because of low priority. Frequently,
 
programs would not run because of a slight programming or data
 
6Steiner, George A., Top Management Planning, Collier-Macmillan
 
Canada, Ltd., Toronto, Ontario, 1969, p. 495.
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error. Results from previous runs had-to be analyzed before
 
the next step could be taken. Forms had to be filled out and
 
cards punched and checked.
 
Many of the people that were doing work which required
 
computer use found themselves with very little to do except
 
wait for the next set of numbers to come back from the computer.
 
For managers, the computer came to represent trouble. Computers
 
were (and are) expensive, required special facilities as well as
 
special staffs of operations, programmers and key punch opera­
tors. As is so frequently the case with humans, the good got
 
buried -under the bad. "Computer trouble" became a standard
 
excuse for not having work completed. These difficulties arose
 
from trying'to make operations use of computer tools that were
 
not yet prepared to meet the need and with personnel that did
 
not quite know how to best use the tools available.
 
Paradoxically, computers made many of the developments in
 
the defense industry possible. But they also contributed signi­
ficantly to its problems, especially the problems of cost and
 
personnel morale. Costs increased because of computer facili­
ties and the special-staffs required to operate them in addi­
tion to the double requirement for technical personnel; one to
 
get the program needs accomplished and another to make the com­
puter useful. Morale decreased because so many people were
 
simply gathering and preparing data for the computer or waiting
 
around for answers to come back. The people were almost, but
 
not quite replaced by the machine.
 
Now, just as the industry is getting accustomed to using
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the third generation computer equipment as technical and opera­
tional tools, a new revolution is upon us. -Computer'technology
 
has reached the point that new developments are keeping pace
 
with and exceeding our ability to make use of them.
 
Hardware and software developments that have become opera­
tional in the last year or two enable the technical personnel
 
to work directly with the computer in real-time. Information
 
storage and retrieval systems have essentially infinite capacity
 
enabling both management and technical personnel to have all
 
necessary data literally at their finger tips. These technolog­
ical developments will require that personnel at all levels be­
come "thinkers" and planners instead of primarily "doers."
 
The main difference between the increasing pressure
 
from the quantitative areas and other forces for
 
change lies in the magnitude and pervasiveness of
 
its impact. It will affect every facet of business
 
organization. No executive can afford to ignore
 
the new demands it will make on management and still
 
expect to be successful beyond the next five to ten
 
years. These demands, I believe, will prove personally
 
more onerous to many executives than they have any
 
reason to expect from their past experiences. 7
 
Nor will it be sufficient for these executives to instruct
 
their staffs to implement a system. The most prevalent reason
 
for failure, or at least marginally satisfactory performance
 
from the application of the computer to management problems
 
8
 
has been attributed to inadequate planning. Specifically,
 
7Vandell, p. 92
 
8Lack of adequate planning has been mentioned in at least a
 
dozen articles reviewed by the author. A few of these are:
 
Vandell, pp. 90-91; Steiner, p. 6; John Diebold, "Bad Deci­
sions on Computer Use," Harvard Business Review, January-

February, 1969, p. 15.
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the planners failed to consider implementation of computer
 
hardware as a system to serve managers. John Diebold states
 
in the Harvard Business Review that the prime reason for the
 
failure of management information systems to realize their
 
potential is because computer technicians, not managers have
 
set the goals. 9 Unfortunately, most technicians are inclined
 
to be primarily interested in the hardware and software per se
 
without adequate concern for the rest of the system.
 
Planning at all levels is becoming more important than
 
ever before. Primarily because computer aided design and
 
computer controlled manufacturing can be so much faster than
 
previous experience would indicate that the margin for error
 
will be greatly reduced.
 
Intuitive and reactive managerial styles are already on
 
the wane. Increased emphasis is being placed on "scientific"
 
analysis and planning. Experience is still invaluable (if
 
it is up-to-date), but it must be used with greater discipline.
 
Analysis is now more vigorous, and computer techniques

permit more alternatives to be analyzed in greater
 
depth. But most important, formal planning is being

used as a basis for action, not nearly for pro forma
 
exercises. Ten years ago this sort of planning was a
 
rarity.10
 
Computer Related Hardware
 
Computer technology, like so many other technological
 
developments, has increased at a logarithmic rate. Starting
 
9Diebold, 
p. 14.
 
10Vandell, p. 87.
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slowly, accelerated in mid growth until development occur at
 
an incredible rate as the system matures. Addition speed has
 
long been a basic index of computer development. A few speci­
fic data points on how this index has changed over the years
 
provides an accurate context for evaluating the impact of com­
puter technology on industry in general and program management
 
in particular. In 1944, Professor H. Aiden of Harvard, working
 
with IBM, developed one of the first automatic general-purpose
 
digital computers. It used relays as had Dr. George Stibitz
 
of Bell Telephone Laboratories when in 1939, he used standard
 
telephone relays, to make a digital computer for simple calcu­
lations. Professor Aiden's computer ground out urgent military
 
computations for many years at the rate of three additions per
 
second. In 1946, Dr. John W. Mauchly of the University of
 
Pennsylvania School of Electrical Engineering completed Eniac
 
(Electron Numerical Integrator and Calculator) which had been
 
designed for speed by using standard radio parts instead of
 
relays. Eniac could add at the rate of 5000 additions per
 
second. During the next ten to fifteen years, the speed had
 
increased to approximately 500,000 additions per second.11
 
Computer speed is now on the order of one billion additions per
 
second, (a manosecond). "A manosecond has the same relation­
ship to a second that a second has to thirty years."1 2
 
Berkeley, pp. 34-35.
 
12Diebold, John, Man and tha Computer, Frederick A Praeger,
 
Publishers, New York, 1969, p. 9.
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11
The next big steps will be large scale integration tech­
niques with metal-oxide semiconductors and the utilization of
 
micrologic circuits in which thousands of active electronic
 
elements are contained on a single silicon chip.1 3
 
By 1975 central computer processing speeds may be
 
increased by a factor of 200, central processing
 
units reduced in size by a factor of 1000, costs
 
cut by a factor of 500 and total U. S. computing
 
power raised by a factor of 1,000.14
 
In addition to greatly increased speed, additional ad­
vances in the last few years stand out as the leading contri­
butors to the quantitative revolution. These are the ability
 
to time-share access to computer facilities through remote
 
terminals and practically unlimited computer storage capacity.
 
These advances, with the great increase in computer processing
 
speed, and the appropriate software, permit each manager, engi­
neer, or whatever, -to have the data they need stored in the
 
computer's data bank and to work directly with the computer in
 
15
 
real-time. However, these tools are still expensive. They
 
are profitable only if their use is carefully planned and they
 
are fully utilized. Fortunately, there are many sizes and types
 
of equipment and many computer, utility services available to
 
choose from. There are so many, in fact, that even listing
 
14 Steiner, p. 498.
 
15Real-time means in this application that the user will get

the data "as fast as I want the answer." For most uses,
 
this is within a few seconds. The quote is from Edward J.
 
Menkhaus, "Time Sharing is Everybody's Thin," Business
 
Automation, September 1969, p. 27.
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the kinds of hardware now available is beyond the scope of this
 
paper. A few specific types will be discussed, however to sug­
gest the current state-of-the-art.
 
Computers -- Almost unlimited variety of computers are 
on the market from desk top calculators to the immense IBM 
System 360 Model 195, expected to be available in early 1971. 
This system is being made to be the central control point for 
a complex airline reservation system; a coast to coast time 
sharing network, or massive scientific studies such as global 
weather forecasting and space exploration. It has an internal 
processing speed nearly twice that of the next most powerful 
machine and can run most programs developed for other IBM 
System 360 models without modification. The main core storage. 
capacity is from 1 to 4 million bytes1 6 of data - "enough to 
handle, for example, all the computer instructions for a space 
mission from launch to recovery." Its internal organization 
permits it to perform multiple tasks in parallel. For example, 
it can be doing two additional and a multiplication simulta­
neously and can process fifteen different jobs concurrently.1 7 
Data Display Equipment - Data display equipment provides
 
one of the most flexible means for communicating -withthe
 
A byte is defined .s a group of bits required to represent
 
a single legitimate character of information. (Many digital
 
processors use six bit byte, newer ones use eight..) Seymour
 
V. Pollack, A Guide to Fortran IV, Columbia University Press,
 
New York, 1965, p. 243.
 
"IBM Announces Super Scale Computers," Business Automation,
 
September 1969, p. 44.
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computer from remote terminals. As with the computers, there
 
are a large variety to choose from. The most common in cur­
rent use is the teletype machine. The operator types in the
 
instructions and the computer types the answer. Although the
 
teletype is slow, it is by far the cheapest. On the other end
 
of the spectrum are consoles containing Cathode Ray Tubes (CTR)
 
for data display, light pens for modifying or manipulating the
 
data, as well as alpha-numeric keyboards with.keys for special
 
functions. Several of these consoles also contain a hard copy
 
printer to provide the user with a permanent copy of the data
 
desired. Business Automation Annual Reference Guide, September
 
1969, lists 25 different manufacturers of CTR display units
 
-alone. Most of these manufacturers offer several.different
 
models to choose from.
 
Until recently only large companies could afford computers.
 
Time-sharing is making the computer available to everyone. The
 
term time-sharing refers to the simultaneous sharing of a com­
puter by numerous persons who communicate with the machine by
 
means of a terminal with a typewriter type keyboard at some
 
remote site. Computers are currently available, such as
 
Scientific Data Systems' Sigma 7, that can accommodate up to
 
18
 
100 users simultaneously. In 1964 time-sharing was rare. By
 
1967 there were approximately 200 time-sharing systems in opera­
tion. The results of a recent study conducted by Honeywell
 
predicts that by 1975, 50 percent of all computers will be
 
1

-
8
"Annual Reference Guide," Business Automation, September 1969.
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-utilized on a time-sharing basis.19
 
Optical Character Readers -- One of the awkward features
 
of computer use in the mid '60's was the requirement to key
 
punch -all work before it could be run on the computer. Optical
 
scanners are now available that can "read" instructions and
 
data typed oh an ordinary typewriter. For example, Recognition
 
Equipment Incorporated's Input 2 System reads hand printed,
 
typed and printed information in ordinary type styles from two
 
lines at once. Its reading.speed is 600 documents a minute.
 
The information is recorded on magnetic tape. Systems 2 can
 
recognize 40 machine printed characters in several type faces. 20
 
Scan Data Corporation's model 300 reads all optical char­
acter reader fonts, all standard typewriter and typeset fonts
 
at the rate of approximately 8'00 characters/second.2 1
 
As with most computer related equipment, flexibility and
 
speed cost more. An optical character reader designed to read
 
all styles of type as well as printed characters and special
 
symbols will be considerably more complex, therefore much more
 
.expensive than a machine designed to "read" U.S. Standard Char­
acter Set for Optical Character Recognition on one size sheets.
 
Again there are many varieties to choose from. These machines
 
will become increasingly important because they can already re­
-duce data input costs by a factor of 10.22
 
1 9Ibid., p. 
-28.
 
2 0Ibid, p. 89.
 
2 1Ibid, p. 93.
 
2 2
"Supersonic Seventies," Business Automation, January 1970, p.4 4
 .
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Microfilm Systems -- One of the basic difficulties in the
 
operation of an effective management information system has
 
been the ability to store and retrieve large quantities of
 
data rapidly and inexpensively. Even without the advances in
 
computer technology, the increased speed, storage densities
 
and retrievability of microfilm handling systems alone is
 
enough to revolutionize information systems. One major step
 
that has yet to be made is the ability to convert from micro­
film back to tape for general applications. Several companies
 
are working on this ability. When it is completed, it will
 
complete a major system capability. Machines are available
 
microfilm computer output directly, on a very high density
 
*microforms. For example, the Mindex Flash 370 by Microform
 
Data Systems, Inc., uses 35 mm ultra strips upon which the
 
images have been reduced by 250:1. Each ultra strip contains
 
2000 8-1/2 inch documents. A standard unit can store between
 
20,000 and 120,000 records with a maximum retrieval time of
 
23
 
six seconds.

The TISAR (Total Information Storage & Retrieval System)
 
by Foto-Mem, Inc., can store pictoral, textual, audio, analog
 
and digital information on microforms randomly or in sequence.
 
The unit is the size of an executive desk yet can store the
 
equivalent of 7 million documents (over a trillion bits). It
 
will display stored information page by page,'print dry hard
 
23 
"Annual Reference Guide," Business Automation, p. 127.
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.copies and permits a user to interrogate, review and update
 
displayed information over the telephone. 2 4
 
The 3M Company makes an Electron Beam Recorder capable of
 
transferring data from magnetic tape to microfilm at the rate
 
at 60,000 characters/second.25
 
Graphic displays such as engineering drawings, forms and
 
charts, can be-prepared, stored and modified by machines such
 
as the Information International. Inc., III FR-80. This
 
machine has a resolution of 16,384 programmable points on 16 mm
 
and 35 mm film. It can produce lines at the rate of 20,000
 
lines/minute, has 8 programmable line widths, 8 line densities,
 
8 spot densities, 5 character rotations and a variety of char­
acter styles. In addition, the user can select standard form
 
overlays or draw directly on microfilm via a cathode ray tube
 
2 6
 
screen with a light pen.
 
These are just a few of the types of data processing equip­
ment now available. Another indication of the variety avail­
able is the number of manufacturers in the field. Business
 
-Automation 
 Annual Reference Guide, September 1969, lists 25
 
manufacturers of Cathode Ray Tube display units, 16 manufacturers
 
of optical scanners, and 34 manufacturers of microfilm readers
 
and reader-printers.
 
2 4
"Annual Reference Guide," Business Automation, p. 125.
 
2 5Menkhaus, Edward J., "Microfilm Captures More of the Action,"
 
Business Automation, May 1969, p. 40.
 
2 6
"Annual Reference Guide," Business Automation, p. 127.
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Computer Related Software
 
The term, "software," refers to the computer languages and
 
to the programs written in these languages. The key to soft­
ware utility is the ease with which the computer can be di­
rected to perform the desired function. Early in the software
 
development history, basic programmer languages were written
 
to enable the programmer to direct the computer to perform
 
frequently used functions by using one word rather than hund­
reds or even thousands of individual machine language instruc­
tions. As the use of computers grew, many companies developed
 
special programs containing millions of machine language in­
structions for their unique needs.
 
Many of these special programs required years to design,
 
debug and make efficient. -Then the company would change com­
puters and the old programs would have to be rewritten for the
 
new machines. This time consuming, tedious, expensive and
 
frustrating need to develop and modify programs has been a
 
major deterrent to the utility of computers in the past.
 
This situation has finally been greatly relieved. Three 
languages are widely used - Algol, Fortran and Cobol - and a 
great many special languages have been developed for specific 
disciplines. 
The next major classification of programs are made to
 
direct the computer to complete the computation of an entire
 
problem with one command such as computer trajectory, design
 
gear, calculate thermal balance. Basic programs exist for
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nearly every routine function. Pundreds of companies are in
 
the business of developing even larger, more specialized pro­
grams that can be purchased for a small fraction of its de­
velopment costs. And the new generation general purpose com­
puters are being designed to be compatible with programs de­
veloped for the last computer generation. 2 7
 
So many computer programs are now available that even a
 
listing of the disciplines for which programs are available
 
would require a sizeable document. A few specific examples
 
are described below to suggest the capabilities that have be­
come operational in the last two or three years.
 
Graphic analysis of three-dimensional data developed by
 
IBM permits raw data to be edited and the results displayed
 
in the form of contour maps, perspective views, cross sections
 
and fence diagrams. 2 8
 
IBM has also developed a program to get around the prob­
lems associated with trying to use several problem languages.
 
Problem languages are-usually written for one specific group,
 
business or disciplines using-terminology that is usually not
 
consistent with standard programming languages. The IBM Pro­
gram Language Analyzer (PLAN) permits a user to combine and
 
27"Supersonic Seventies," p. 47.
 
28
"Graphic Analysis of Three-Dimensional Data (GATD) Applica­
tion Description Manual," H20-0539-0, IBM Technical Publi­
cations, White Plains, New York, 1968.
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even to modify each part,of a given program language so that
 
it can be utilized rapidly for his application. In addition,
 
PLAN will permit the user to arrange the problem language pro­
grams that he needs in an automatic sequence so that he can
 
proce&d step by step through his problem with PLAN pulling in
 
each special program as he needs it.
29
 
Therefore, hardware and software modules are now available
 
to perform most routine managment information, design and con­
trol functions with a minimum of specific adaptation.
 
29 
"Problem Language Analyzer (PLAN) Application Description
 
Manual," H20-0490-1, IBM Technical Publications, White Plains,
 
New York, 1969.
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CHAPTER IV
 
APPLICATION.OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
 
TO SPECIFIC PROGRAM MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
 
As discussed in Chapter II, the 'defense industry is now
 
in a transition period. Application of computer technology
 
to the program management function in the-defense industry is
 
also in a transition period. The last series of major pro­
grams were begun approximately ten years ago. At that time,
 
computer technology had not developed much beyond a few speci­
fic technical and routine administrative applications for
 
which its 'speed and accuracy were necessary.
 
Although computer technology increased tremendously during
 
the subsequent years, most of the managers of those programs
 
simply did not have the -time, nor the inclination, to make the
 
.transition to computerized management tools. In addition, many
 
of the applications that were tried were not particularly use­
ful because they were developed by technicians instead of by
 
the managers for whom the tools were intended.1
 
Only during the last few years have the managers of nearly
 
every major aerospace company begun to- give much greater em­
phasis to the utilization of these tools for management plann­
ing and control as well as for engineering and administrative
 
tasks. The Boeing Company, for example, maintained tight com­
puterized control of the manufacturing, assembly and ground
 
Failure of each manager to become involved in the development
 
of computer applications being designed to serve his needs is,
 
along with inadequate planning, the most frequently mentioned
 
reason for failure of a newly implemented computer system to
 
perform its intended function.
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test of its giant 747 jet transport.

Therefore, the major impact of computer-technology on the
 
policies and processes of major hardware pr6grams is yet to
 
come. Many of the trends, however, are clearly established
 
and are presented in this chapter. Then in Chapters V and VI
 
discussion will turn to policies and processes that ought to
 
exist. That is, to make trends, not follow them to utilize
 
computer technology to improve the well being of the defense
 
contractors and their personnel.3 _
 
For this normative application, primary emphasis is given
 
to the functions of a government agency field unit having
 
direct responsibility for a major program and its direct con­
tractors. The functions of other field units, agency h!ad­
quarters or the contractor's subcontractors and vendors is
 
specifically excluded to simplify the presentation. This pre­
sents no serious omission because similar application of com­
puter tools will applyto these functions as well.
 
Although based primarily on thd Apollo Prbgram structure,
 
the apportionment of tasks in the following discussion is
 
somewhat arbitrary and does not represent any specific govern­
ment agency or contractor.
 
2Silveira, Milton A., 
Engineering and Development Directorate,
 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Manned Space­
craft Center, Houston, Texas.
 
3Steiner, George A., and Ryan, William G., Industrial Project
 
Manaement, Collier-Macmillan Canada, Inc., Toronto; 1968, p.12.
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Computer utilization chosen for each task is based on
 
exIsting trends and assumes that top management is dedicated
 
to making maximum utilization of these tools to reduce the
 
overall cost of the program and that the organization has de­
veloped and operational computer system. That is, that com­
puter related hardware and software have been installed and
 
are operating, that an organizational element exists for de­
veloping and maintaining the data banks and that all personnel
 
have been selected and trained to utilize these capabilities.
 
It is also assumed that a major program will have just com­
pleted conceptual planning and is beginning the hardware de­
finition phase..
 
No allowances are made for any of the limitations required
 
for a real organizational arrangement such as availability of
 
the right kinds of people and the optimum type and location
 
of computer hardware. In this sense, the discussion is in­
tended to be normative, that is, to provide a target of what
 
ought to be, toward which future personnel actions and organi­
zational changes should aim.
 
For this discussion, the-program management role was
 
divided into five major functions plus the program manager.
 
They are: 
Program Manager Responsible for all aspects of the design, 
manufacture, ground and flight tests and 
operation of all systems required for the 
program. 
Program Control Responsible for all business and adminis­
trative aspects of the program. 
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System Responsible for the technical integration

Engineering of all subsystems required for the program.
 
Design & Develop- Responsible for the design of each subsystem
 
ment Engineering required for the program.
 
Industrial Responsible for manufacturing and ground

Engineering testing all hardware and software required
 
for the program.
 
Operations Responsible for the technical performance
 
of all systems, planningtand conducting
 
the flight test program and for the long
 
term operation of the system.
 
To simplify the scenario, assume that each of the above
 
are existing organizational elements and that time-sharing com­
puter facilities were installed and all key personnel given a
 
remote terminal complete with graphic display unit, light pen
 
and hard copy printer. In addition, each of the major functions
 
has its own, unlimited data bank. Access to each data bank is
 
controlled by the manager of the function, subject to being
 
over-ruled only by the program manager.
 
The same format is used for the following discussion of
 
-each functional area. 
First, the overall function is described
 
in more detail. Then, two or three specific tasks are defined
 
*and the impact of the new computer tools is explored for each.
 
The Program Manager4
 
Since this discussion is somewhat idealistic, assume that
 
the program manager has been given a specification for the total
 
4The Program Manager tasks for which computer technology would
 
be particularly helpful, therefore were included in this paper

and were suggested by Col. James A. McDivitt, Manager of Apollo
 
Spacecraft Program Office.
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system, a set of general agency policies and standards, a total
 
budget and a schedule for having the first vehicle operational.
 
In addition, assume that he has complete-autonomy within these
 
limits including the right to select contractors and to hire,
 
or transfer out of the program, anyone he chooses. The manager's
 
policy is that each of the subordinate managers and supervisors
 
have explicitly defined responsibilities, budgets and schedules
 
and they have control over -and are held accountable for each.
5
 
Program Status -- As a matter of policy, the program man­
ager meets briefly with all of the programs functional managers
 
and supervisors each morning in the Program Status Room main­
tained by Program Control. Each morning upcoming events and
 
past accomplishments of.program-wide interest are announced and
 
general status is received with specific emphasis on a different
 
area each morning.
 
In the past, computer systems had no direct function in
 
the status report. A special staff contacted each supervisor
 
daily to ascertain the status of each item for which that super­
visor was responsible, then modified the status boards accord­
ingly. For special presentations, the responsible supervisor
 
would prepare view graphs and copies of charts and drawings he
 
wished to discuss for distribution at the meeting.
 
With the computer systems, the program manager will be able
 
to have the status of any aspect of the program displayed on
 
5 Steiner, Chapter 2.
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his remote terminal scope. The morning meetings will still be
 
held. However, the manager will already know the status of
 
each area and discussion will deal primarily with problem areas.
 
Major accomplishments and upcoming events might be covered, but
 
since they will be available to all at any time via their own
 
remote terminal scopes, they probably will not be discussed ex­
cept for items of particular significance.
 
The special staff that had maintained the status room will
 
be eliminated. Each supervisor will maintain his own status
 
displays simply by calling them up on his scope and making the
 
necessary modifications using the typewriter keyboard and light
 
pencil on his remote console. Each of these will be coded such
 
that only the-person responsible can change it. However, any­
one on the program can call up the display for his information
 
any time he chooses. For special presentations, the person
 
making the presentation can call up any chart, drawing, figure
 
or any other data in his data bank from the presentation room
 
remote terminal. Questions requiring computation or data mani­
pulation can be answered in real time. If a hard copy of any
 
of the material is desired, it can be printed on the spot.
 
Trade Off Studies -- In the past, if the program manager
 
wanted to find out "what if," he would explain what he wanted
 
to his staff or one of the function managers, then wait for the
 
answer. Hopefully, the answer that came back was for the
 
questions he had intended, but it frequently was not. In addi­
tion, getting -the final answer he desired was usually an itera­
tive process requiring days or even week. With a remote
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terminal and access to all of the programs data banks, he could
 
work out the answers himself in less time than it would take to
 
explain the question to someone else.
 
Correspondence -- Perhaps the most onerous task faced by
 
any program manager of a large program is keeping up with the
 
correspondence. The extent to which computer technology could
 
reduce this task is a function of the particular manager. Since
 
all reports and memoranda can be prepared with the aid of a
 
computer and stored in a data bank with'all incoming mail, it
 
would be a simple matter for the manager to simply call up the
 
titles and authors for each item written within the organizar
 
tion or received from outside the organization within a given
 
.timeperiod. He could then have the front page of those he was
 
interested in displayed so that he could scan iti If desired,
 
he could either read it all on the scope or he could request
 
that a hard copy be printed for his retention.
 
Such a system would save considerable time and expense
 
as well as making the information available much sooner. The
 
majority of the paper that crosses a manager's desk, except
 
for correspondence he must sign or explicitly approve, is for
 
general information and a quick scan is all that is necessary.
 
It would be a simple matter to arrange the display sequence so
 
that the manager would simply have to touch the "next" key when
 
ready to change to the next page or the next document.
 
6 Several remote terminal models are equipped with special func­
tion keys that can be used to initiate a frequently used com­
puter function to eliminate the need to type in specific in­
structions each time.
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The cost of correspondence would be reduced in several ways.
 
By using computer aided correspondence preparation, editing,
 
corrections, updating periodic form memoranda or reports would
 
be greatly simplified with the attendent savings of both the
 
author's and the secretary's time. In addition, little or no
 
reproduction would be required. Each piece of correspondence
 
will contain a distribution list, is always. However, instead
 
of mailing a hard copy, as soon as the correspondence is re­
leased, it is stored in the data bank and its title, author and
 
date are added automatically to each addressee's incoming cores­
spondence list to be read at the addressee's leisure. And
 
finally, hard copies need not be filed anywhere because it
 
would be stored in a computer data bank, or a microfilm file
 
or both. It would be accessible any time to anyone authorized
 
to have the information. The savings in both paper and file
 
cabinets should be impressive.
 
Program Control
 
Program control is responsible for the integration of all
 
program costs and schedules, the administration of all contracts
 
and for controlling the use of all computer systems charged to
 
the program. Control usually implies authority by sanction.
 
In this application, however, it implies authority by knowledge.
 
Program control cannot direct the functional managers or their
 
respective line supervisors to do anything. Their function is
 
to assure that everything required for the program has been
 
explicitly assigned to someone and to pull-together and inte­
grate all cost and schedule related information. When they
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find trends or forecasts that are inconsistent with the needs
 
of another element of the program or with the overall program
 
plan, they point -out the conflict to the cognizant functional
 
managers or supervisors and help them work out a solution.
 
Program control is requited to enforce policy related to
 
budgets and correspondence to contractors. 
 If, for example,
 
a supervisor wants to award a small study contract, but the
 
amount exceeds his discretionary fund limit, Program Control
 
cannot authorize the contract. Or if a group exceeds its com­
puter budget, every subsequent use must be explicitly approved
 
by the program manager until they get back within their budget.
 
These are not really sanctions; rather they are strict enforce­
ment of policy. Each supervisor and each functional manager
 
has his own discretionary cost and schedule flexibility. 
These
 
limits can only be exceeded bY explicit approval of his im­
mediate supervisor, subject to appeal to the program manager.
 
Three specific tasks which illustrate the impact of com­
puter technology on Program Control are the development and
 
maintenance of the Program Plan, control of correspondence to
 
contractors and control of computer utilization.
 
Program Plan 7 -- Program planning personnel work with each
 
organizational element to determine the activities that must be
 
performed, the approximate time required to perform these activi­
ties and their relationship to other activities in the program.
 
7.•
 
Discussion of the Program Plan and control of correspondence is
 
based on the author's experience-as confirmed by Mr. James
 
Shannon, Lunar Module Project Officer for the Apollo Program

.Office, NASA, MSC, Houston, Texas.
 
Then these activities are arranged by need sequence.
 
A large program has thousands of interdependent activities
 
even when the level of activity considered for the planning
 
charts is limited to key events. When done "by hand," that is,
 
a computer is not used, only major events can be successfully
 
coordinated. The same limitations exist for each level in the
 
hierarchy. By the time planning gets to the detail required
 
for daily activities, hundreds of people are involved and the
 
coordination and integration of interacting need dates is very
 
difficult. Mismatches are frequently missed.
 
Perhaps the biggest problem is caused by program changes.
 
For example, a hardware change might increase schedule pressure
 
for one string of events, but relax the pressure for another
 
string. Each element in the string of events for which the 
pressure is increased is nearly always notified of the change. 
However, it is not unusual for many of those for whom pressure 
has been relaxed to never get the word. They will continue at
 
the previous pace, frequently using overtime, special handling
 
and other expensive extras to meet deadlines that are no longer
 
valid.
 
Another difficulty is thatthe program plan is not an
 
"action" document, that is, it is not used for day to day de­
cisions. It is usually out of date even the day it is printed
 
because preparation time is slower than change activity. 
Even
 
in organizations employing planning tools such as 
computerized
 
PERT find that all too often it becomes a pro forma exercise
 
because it is usually out-of date. The critical path-shown
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today was really the critical path two or three weeks ago be-.
 
cause of the delay in collecting data, getting it transcribed
 
into a form suitable for the computer and waining for a block
 
of -computer time long enough to permit computation of the net­
work.
 
With the new computer system, as each supervisor updates
 
his daily planning chart, utilizing his remote computer termi­
nal, his element of the PERT network would be automatically
 
updated. With the greatly increased computer speed, portions
 
of the network could be run any time. However, network will
 
probably be run every night so that all of the day's program
 
changes would be included and so that these changes could be
 
noted during the next morning's status meetings (at the Govern­
ment agency and the contractor's plants-).
 
Two general types of changes are involved, those that
 
change the program plan and those that only change status re­
lative to the program plan. By maintaining the program plan
 
in the same data bank as other planning tools, each unit's
 
status could be presented relative to the appropriate position
 
of the program plan. Since each would be updated daily the
 
program plan would become the viable tool it was intended to be.
 
Contractor Correspondence Control -- One particular aspect 
of correspondence control that has been difficult for Program 
Control to deal with adequately is technical direction to the 
contractors. Since letters of direction can influence contract 
8Ibid.
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costs, schedules and-contractor's profit, all such correspond­
ence must be signed by the contracting officer or his repre­
sentative. The difficulty is that the contracting officer
 
usually lacks sufficient information to make a meaningful de­
cision.
 
It was not uncommon to find that several elements of the
 
government had sent contradictory direction to the contractor
 
over a period of a few weeks. The only way for the contracting
 
officer to prevent this was to have a superhuman memory, check
 
his files and hold a meeting on each piece of questionable cor­
respondence. The flood of correspondence renders all of these
 
methods useless-except for the most obviously inappropriate.
 
By having the contract, specification, policies and pre­
vious correspondence in the data bank, and with the powerful
 
document retrieval software that have been developed recently,
 
the contracting officer need only insert his specific question
 
and the computer will search the files for all information on
 
that specific subject for his review. By carefully planning
 
the display format, questions can be answered in a few seconds
 
each.-

Computer Utilization Control -- Computer application must
 
be controlled carefully if costs are important. Several authors
 
have mentioned that people quickly become dependent upon-the
 
computer as a substitute for thinking. "Every formal system,
 
if taken too seriously and rigidly will become more of a
 
9
hinderance than a help." Computer systems frequently lead to
 
9
"Putting Judgment back into Decisions," Harvard Business Review,
 
March-April, 1970, p. 67.
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many statistical reports, larger staffs and larger amounts of
 
data that are never used.1 0 This tendency to over-use the com­
puter can become prevalent so easily that when multiplied by
 
all users in the government and at the contractors, it can in­
crease the cost of the program considerably. The objective
 
behind constant attention to computer utilization, then, is
 
to force a constant reminder that computer time is money.
 
This task is included in Program Control because of the im­
portance of coordination with management needs on a program
 
wide basis.1
1
 
System Engineering
 
System Engineering serves very much the same function for
 
the technical effort that program control serves 
for the busi­
ness and administrative efforts. 
 Early in a program, System
 
Engineering apportions hardware performance requirements among
 
the various subsystems. The objective is to attain an optimum
 
total performance solution considering the high cost of unique
 
hardware, mission objectives for which the optimum hardware
 
performance are contradictory and components for which high
 
performance requirements are incompatible with high reliability.
 
As the design progresses and hardware is being developed, sys­
tem analysis personnel assure that the various elements of the
 
system are mutually compatible. In addition, occasionally one
 
element will be unable to attain its performance or reliability
 
1 0Ibid, p. 66.
 
llSteiner, George A., Top Management Planning, Collier-Macmillan
 
Canada, Inc., Toronto, 1969, p. 480.
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requirements. System analysts will examine the other elements
 
of the system to determine if performance requirements can be
 
shifted or modified to alleviate the difficulty.
 
Computer technology can greatly improve the quality of
 
the systems analysts function by permitting the performance
 
interaction between each element to be simulated to 
assure
 
overall compatibility as well as assuring that the system can
 
meet its overall performance requirements. This type of model
 
is particularly useful for evaluating the effects of changing
 
one element of the system or the environment in which the sys­
tem must operate.
 
Another classic system analysis function is determining
 
how to modify an existing system to meet new requirements, to
 
improve its overall realiability or some aspect of its per­
formance. Again a computerized vehicle performance model is
 
a very useful tool. Alternative solutions can be tried to
 
determine which provides the greatest increment in performance
 
with the fewest complications for the rest of the system.
 
Vehicle Integration 
-- System Engineering also includes
 
those engineering disciplines that affect and are affected by
 
every other element of the system. For example, materials,
 
vehicle dynamics, vehicle thermal control, design integration,
 
weight and balance and interface control. These tasks have
 
traditionally been seriously hampered because they are dependent
 
upon each of the other engineering functions for input and be­
cause the analysis and calculation of the overall systems re­
sponse in their area of interest is very tedious, complex and
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frought with uncertainty. Hence, these functions have been
 
most important yet are poorly equipped to perform their role.
 
Computer technology provides-an ideal tool for these applica­
tions. By using preliminary design estimates of the char­
-acteristics, weight, etc., 
for each vehicle element, these
 
groups can develop a systems model for their area of interest.
 
These models are used to quickly balance the system performance,
 
identify areas in which performance is inadequate or more than
 
adequate and, most important, can identify incompatibles while
 
they are easily modified. All too frequently such incompat­
ibles are not discovered until the vehicle was being assembled
 
or tested. Changes this late in the program are obviously
 
very expensive.
 
Design and Development Engineering
 
Detailed design and analysis of specific subsystems such
 
as structures, propulsion, guidance, navigation-, electric
 
power, communication, environmental control and crew equipment
 
collectively comprise the design engineering function. 
Similar
 
tasks are conducted in each area during the course of a-program.,
 
Each maintains a current knowledge of the state-of-the-art and
 
.a file on component suppliers. Each conducts subsystem design
 
and performance analysis, engineering tests, and coordinates
 
with the manufacturing and support equipment functions.
 
Design groups have been using computer programs for the
 
analysis of an increasing number of subsystem characteristics
 
for several years. However, the use of a data bank and computer
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graphs are beginning to have great impact on engineering func
 
tion.
 
-The Search for Information 
-- In the past a large-per­
centage of a design engineer's time was required to find sup­
pliers for the components needed for his design. He would
 
search catalogs, call suppliers, ask friends and negotiate
 
special orders because he could not find existing components
 
to fit his needs.
 
Optical character readers and microfilm recording, stor­
age and retrieval systems and computer programs which can
 
search for, compare and display words as well as their context
 
provide all members of the team easy access to information that
 
previously was 
unavailable or required considerable effort to
 
find. The computer can select the appropriate catalogs, draw­
ings, specification paragraphs and statements in any other ap­
plicable documents such as design standards so that the re­
sponsible engineer can quickly find the information he needs.
 
He would simply query the computer or microfilm information
 
system for the component having the particular characteristics
 
he desired and a list of these components most .nearly matching
 
his specifications would be available in a few seconds. 
 Data
 
banks also greatly facilitate checking specifications, design
 
standards and interface drawings during the course of the de­
sign to assure compliance.
 
Computer Aided Design-- Computer graphics represents a
 
particularly powerful tool for the designer. 
Suppose, for
 
example, 
-that-a designer had the taskof arranging twenty
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electronic assemblies on an equipment rack subject to a series
 
of contraints, they must be packaged such that they would fit
 
within an existing irregular volume. They must be arranged
 
so that each receives a specific amount of cooling. In addi­
tion, sufficient space must be allotted for assembly and for
 
the shortest practical path for wiring these assemblies to a
 
given junction box. Countless man hours of trial and error,
 
sketches and drawing projections from various directions had
 
to be carefully constructed to determine whether or not phy­
sical interference existed. This task typically requires no
 
great creativity or knowledge, but does require a tremendous
 
amount of tedious, routine work. It is the perfect assignmnt
 
for a computer system. Utilizing his computer driven remote
 
terminal scope, the designer would first feed the dimensions
 
of each assembly and the volume available into the computer.
 
Then he would call for a list of the assemblies and the "plan­
form" view of the volume available to be displayed on his scone.
 
To arrange the assemblies he would first touch the assembly he
 
wanted to place, punch in the code, telling the computer to
 
select the dimensions of that assembly and move it to the next
 
spot he touched on the scope. Assembly by assembly, the com­
puter would sketch in the outlines of each assembly wherever
 
the designer indicated. After adjusting the locations of each
 
assembly in one view to his satisfaction, the designer would
 
check for interference in other views by simply directing the
 
computer to rotaEe the picture so that he could check all
 
dimensions. When satisfied with a particular arrangement, he
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would direct to computer to calculate the thermal balance to
 
assure that each assembly would be cooled adequately. After
 
making any necessary corrections, the designer would request
 
the computer to print several selected views of the arrange­
ment as well as the results of the thermal analysis. One man
 
working directly with the computer can thus accomplish in a
 
few hours what has frequently required several designers, entgi­
neers and draftsmen days and even weeks to complete.1 2
 
Industrial Engineering1 3
 
Industrial engineering includes all functions required
 
to manufacture, assemble and check out the completed assembly
 
such as analysis of the manufacturing sequence, configuration
 
control and ground testing.
 
Manufacturing Analysis 
-- Manufacturing analysis includes
 
planning the step by step processes, tools, support equipment
 
and labor required to convert the basic raw materials into the
 
finished vehicle in accordance to the manufacturing drawings
 
prepared by the design groups. Computer tools have the same
 
application in the manufacturing analysis as in the system or
 
design analysis. By using a mechanized scheduling scheme such
 
as PERT, scheduling each event from ordering material through
 
1 2Milton A. Silveira.
 
1 3The following grouping of tasks and major uses 
of computer

tools resulted from a communication with Martin Raines, Di­
rector of Reliability and Quality Assurance, NASA, MSC.
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the assembly and testing of each component, assembly and sub­
system. Utilization of resources can be optimized and alter­
natives worked around plans can be similated to select the
 
least overall impact for unexpected delays.
 
By including the costs of all elements in the manufactur­
ing process such as manpower, storage, extra equipment and
 
additional facilities, decisions can be based on their impact
 
on the total manufacturing cost and schedule picture as op­
posed to only one particular segment at a time. For example,
 
it might be cheaper in the long run to pay a premium to have
 
extra equipment installed at a critical point in the manufactur­
ing flow than to add a week to the manufacturing period. Con­
versely, it might be less expensive to allow final assembly
 
schedule to slip a month rather than force several subcontrac­
tors to expend premium pay and extra equipment to maintain the
 
original schedule. Computer analysis of the overall manufac­
turing process including cost estimates will permit the pro­
gram managers to make better overall decisions by providing
 
mroe precise and current information.
 
Configuration and Process Control -- Configuration and
 
process control are of utmost importance for maintaining high
 
reliability and quality of the end item. Quality materials,
 
sound design and manufacturing standards and practices as well
 
as skilled, careful employees are, of course, of fundamental
 
importance. The classic difficult is how to obtain and main­
tain these high standards. Computer technology can help by
 
maintaining a current record of the location and status of
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every piece of material that enters the plant. One technique
 
is to attach a coded card to every batch of material as it
 
passes through receiving inspection. Then, at every step in
 
which a portion of that batch is used, the card (or one like
 
it, as the batch is subdivided) is simply inserted into a
 
timeclock type data input device which records the parts code,
 
time and date as well as the code for the process that is just
 
beginning. The data input device sends this information to
 
the computer data bank. As the components are assembled, new
 
codes are used to represent a collection of specific items in­
to alhigher level assembly to keep down the volume of numbers.
 
However, each individual part's total history is readily avail­
able in the data bank. The reason for maintaining such a com­
plete file is to permit rapid location of any material, work
 
from a particular machine at a particular time or other pro­
cesses which might have produced a "bad batch" for some reason.
 
Occasionally, an inadequate product is not discovered until
 
the assembly is complete-enough to be tested, weeks or even
 
months later. By this time the other defective parts of the
 
"bad batch" have been dispersed in other assemblies, in parts
 
bins or elsewhere. Without a computer system to isolate these
 
defective parts quickly, additional weeks could go by before
 
all defective parts had been located. By that time, complete
 
assemblies would require expensive rework to replace the de­
fective component. Since this data can be stored in a data
 
bank, it can also be used for manufacturing schedule control
 
as well as for determining exactly which parts are in each
 
vehicle.
 
67
 
Automation of many of the routine manufacturing functions
 
is another rapidly increasing application of computer techno­
logy. Several electronic firms now, for example, design, manu­
facture and test many of their special electronic micro-logic
 
circuits completely automatically. Not only is this automated
 
production cheaper and faster, but the end product has much
 
greater uniformityand reliability. 14
 
Testing -- One application of these computer designed and
 
manufactured micro-logic circuits is to continuously monitor
 
the health and performance of every electronics assembly.1 5
 
These micro-logic circuits are so small, their weight and
 
volume are so negligible that they can be designed as an in­
ternal part of each assembly. In fact, the total weight added
 
will usually be considerably less than the wires previously re­
quired to connect the sensors located through the vehicle sys­
tem to various warning lights, controls and displays for as­
certaining the health of the system.
 
On the Apolld spacecraft, the status of each subsystem
 
is monitored by sensors .located on each of a limited number of
 
critical components. Some of this information can be displayed
 
directiy for flight crew information. However, most of the
 
data are transmitted to the remote ground station that happens
 
1 4Kugle, Don, Director of Computer Applications, TRW Houston
 
Operations.
 
1 5Mueller, George E., "Applications of Computers to Manned
 
Spacecraft,-" Computer Group News; September 1969, pp. 42-46.
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to be in direct contact with the spacecraft at that time. A
 
computer at the remote ground station processes the data and
 
sends one of several preselected data formats to the Mission
 
Control Center at Houston, Texas, via a limited capacity ground
 
line or via a communication satellite. At the Mission Control
 
Center, other computers process the information into prearranged
 
formats to bd displayed to the various flight controllers.
 
Each flight controller monitors the data for which he is re­
sponsible to detect any abnormality that might indicate a prob­
lem.
 
By designing diagnostic micro-logic circuits into each
 
active spacecraft assembly, then connecting each of these diag­
nostic circuits to an onboard -computer, the need for ground
 
monitoring-will be essentially eliminated. One onboard com­
puter can replace-many computers on the ground as well as the
 
large staff of technical experts that has been assembled for
 
each of the previous flights.
 
These same diagnostic micro-logic circuits can also be
 
used to checkout and test each assembly as the spacecraft is
 
being assembled and during preflight checkout. This will save
 
a great deal of time and money by eliminating the requirement
 
for special test and checkout equipmen-

Operations
 
In a sense, operations is both the beginning and the end
 
of the hardware development process. Since they are responsi­
ble for the operation of this system after it has become
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operational, they are also the source ot the overall system
 
performance requirements necessary to accomplish the/program
 
objectives. In addition, they are usually responsible for con­
ducting the flight test program to assure that the vehicle is
 
r6ady for operational status. Specific functions -include sys­
tems operation, flight crew training., ground crew training,
 
maintenance and the operation of ground support facilities.
 
Operations has long been one of the leading users of com­
puter technology for crew training, data processing and mission
 
planning. However, there are still many areas in which an un­
limited data bank and the reduced cost and increased speed of
 
new time shared computers will be most beneficial. Two parti­
cular tasks for which this is true are the development, stor­
age and retrieval of "what-if" data and automatic vehicle per­
formance monitoring and data processing.
 
"What-If" Data1 6 -- In order to cope with emergencies, 
operations personnel, especially flight and ground support 
teams, need to have as much data as possible on the actual 
performance limits of each vehicle subsystem and what happens 
when that limit is exceeded. Engineering analysis, ground test 
and flight test programs have long been the best source for 
-thisdata. However, most of the data were "lost" to the 
operations personnel because the data were not stored in a 
useable or retrievable form. For example, the results of an 
1Author's personal experience.
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engineer's file but the assumptions or input conditions would
 
be missing. Although ground test output data are usually taped,
 
the input conditions -might not be and the data is therefor
 
rarely useable.
 
To make this data useful, a special task would be required
 
to organize and correlate the raw data so that it could be
 
stored and retrieved in a useable form. Microfilm provides
 
an ideal tool for storing this type of data because it is much
 
cheaper and requires must less volume than magnetic tape.
 
Automatic Vehicle Performance Monitoring 1 8 -- One of the 
major uses of computer technology for the NASA manned space 
flights has been preparation for and real time monitoring of 
vehicle performance. The greatly increased speed and reduced 
weight and volume of computers has enabled system designers to
 
move the primary vehicle monitory function on board the space­
craft as described in the last section. Caution signals will
 
be sent directly to the flight crew if tolerances are exceeded.
 
Data that must be transmitted to the mission control center can
 
be greatly reduced and simplified. Not only because much less
 
data is required with the emphasis on onboard monitoring, but
 
also by utilizing a "change only" concept. That is, the re­
mote computer would only transmit data for those functions that
 
changed by some predetermined amount since the last time that
 
particular function had been checked.
 
1 9The following are based on the author's experience modified
 
somewhat by a discussion with Sigurd Sjoberg, Director, Flight

Operations Directorate, NASA, MSC.
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As a result, far fewer flight control equipment and per­
sonnel will be required for real time monitoring.
 
Conclusion
 
The foregoing applications of computer technology were
 
included to provide specific and tangible evidence that com­
puter technology can force a great variety of changes on a
 
single program. After such a computer. system is in operation,
 
a much better job can be done much faster by far fewer people.
 
However, many new operational and management techniques will
 
be required and considerable retraining will be necessary.
 
Such a transition will require years to complete.
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-CHAPTER V
 
LIBERATION FROM BONDAGE: THE HUMAN ELEMENT
 
The high cost of existing policies and practices to defense
 
industry personnel was discussed in Chapter II (Anguish in the
 
Defense Industry). Specifically mentioned were the generally
 
poor morale due to the feast or famine nature of the industry,
 
the underutilization of employees capabilities and the frequen
 
lack of correlation between performance and rewards.
 
This chapter is devoted to an examination of the research
 
in human behavior and motivation to explicitly define the basic
 
concepts and variables that significantly influence individual
 
morale and.productivity. Then, the specific implications that
 
computer utilization has had, and is expected to have, on these
 
personnel problems is discussed. These human relations con­
siderations are of fundamental importance to the successful
 
accomplishment of the objective of this paper. Costs cannot
 
be-reduced significantly, nor can quality be increased, unless
 
the work required for a given program can be accomplished by
 
fewer, highly motivated and-well managed personnel.
 
Research in Human Behavior
 
Considerable research has been conducted during the last
 
two decades from the industrial management point of reference
 
to determine how to make workers more productive. In addition,
 
considerable'research and analysis has been aimed from the
 
psychological point of view at how a human would develop and
 
.function if left to his own resources and not constrained to
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fit into an organizational mold. Happily, regardless of their
 
original intent, both approaches have reached essentially the
 
same conclusions. In our society, an individual will be posi­
tively motivated to perform at the level of his ability and
 
-will feel much greater self esteem if he can work in a coopera­
tive environment on a task that presents a challenge and enough
 
freedom for him to exercise initiative and choice in its exe­
cution.
 
Many author's have written on this subject. The basic
 
concepts, however, have been adequately described in concepts
 
prepared by: A. H. Maslow, Chris Argyris, Frederick Hertzberg,-

Douglas McGregor and Rensis Likert.
 
Generic Human Characteristics -- In "A Theory of Human 
Motivation: the Basic Needs," A. H. Maslow presented his 
hierarchy of human needs:
1 
Survival The physiological needs for food, shelter,
 
-rest and exercise.
 
Safety 	 Protection against danger, threat or de­
privation.
 
Social 	 A sense of belonging, acceptance by peers.
 
Egoistic 	 Self-confidence, independence, achievement,
 
competence and knowledge, in short, one's
 
self esteem;
 
Self-Fulfillment 	 Realizing one's own potential, creativity,
 
self development.
 
iMaslow, A. H., "A Theory of Human Motivation: The Basic Needs,"
 
from David R. Hampton, Charles E. Summer and Ross A. Webber,
 
Organizational Behavior and the Practice of-Management, Scott,
 
Foresman and Company, Glenview, Illinois,-1968, pp. 27-39.
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According to Mr. Maslow, these needs are independent and over­
lapping. Although one cannot be concerned with self-fulfillment
 
if basic survival or safety needs are of primary importance,
 
one can devote some energy to egoistic needs even though social
 
and safety needs are not completely satisfied.
 
In other words, a human being will not be motivated by
 
self-fulfillment goals if his basic survival needs have not
 
been met. On the other hand, offering more salary is not ef­
fective as a motivator for an individual that already has more
 
than enough.to satisfy all of his basic needs except for self­
fulfillment.
 
Another useful concept, developed by Chris Argyris in
 
The Individual and the Organization, claims that "the self, in
 
this culture, tends to develop along specific trends which are
 
operationally definable and emperically observable."' These
 
basic developmental trends are that the human being:
 
1. 	 tends to develop from a state of being passive as an in­
fant to a state of increasing activity as an adult.
 
2. 	 tends to develop from a state of dependence upon others
 
as an infant to a state of relative independence as an
 
adult.
 
3. 	 tends to develop from being capable of behaving in only
 
a few ways as an infant to being capable of behaving in
 
many different ways as an adult.
 
4. 	 tends to develop from being erratic, casual, shallow,
 
quickly'dropping interests as an infant to possessing
 
a deepening of interests as an adult.
 
2Argyris, Chris, "The Individual and the Organization," from
 
Michael D. Reagan, The Administration of Public Policy, Scott,
 
Foresman and Company, Glenview, Illinois, 1969, p. 72.
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5. 	 tends to develop from having a short time perspective
 
(i.e., the present largely determines behavior) of an
 
infant to having a much longer time perspective as an
 
adult (i.e., the individual's behavior is more affected
 
by the past and the future).
 
6. 	 tehds to develop from being in a subordinate position
 
in the family and society as an infant to aspiring to
 
occupy at least and equal and/or superordinate position
 
relative to his peers.
 
7.-	 tends to develop from having a lack of awareness of the
 
self as an infant to having an awareness of and control
 
over the self as an adult.
 
These concepts help explain why the industrial revolution
 
brought with it the tradition that the job is only a place to
 
earn money. Two historical factors are particularly signifi­
cant. The first is the concept of scientific management pre­
sented by Frederick W. Taylor in the 1940's. In this concept,
 
the worker is considered to be a machine.' The best production
 
rate can be achieved if each and every action required for the
 
job is carefully planned and each employee is taught exactly
 
how to perform his assigned task. Instead of developing the
 
greater independence, deepening interest, longer time perspec­
.tive and greater control over his activities needed for normal
 
human development, scientific management forced just the oppo­
site. In addition, many of these workers had been forced by
 
economic need (safety and survival) from the farm where they
 
had enjoyed a positive environment for human development.
 
Therefore, it is not difficult to understand the negative pro­
gression faced by these individuals that have so strongly in­
fluenced our societies attitude toward industry in general.
 
Nor have we progressed very far in many industries. The
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typical development engineer, for example, is just another
 
white shirt in a huge room filled with white shirts, each being­
told exactly what he should do, when he should to'it and re­
ceiving essentially the same pay and rewards as the other
 
workers regardless of his contribution. Also, most programs
 
or projects have been so fragmented by specialization and the
 
program hierarchies contain so many levels that even promotion
 
to the next level providesvery little and temporary improve­
mentin the workers' basic need structure.
 
Motivation -- These concepts help explain Frederick
 
Hertzberg's and Rensis Lebert's findings on human motivation-.
 
In an extensive and highly sophisticated study conducted during
 
the 1950's, Hertzberg and his researchers interviewed a large
 
number of workers several times over a five-year period to
 
determine the short-range and long-range effects of various
 
3
job attitude factors.

Most of these factors turned out to be what he has called
 
"hygiene" factors. That is, they are necessary for a healthy
 
work environment, but cannot by themselves increase the moti­
vation to work. Hygiene factors include supervision, inter­
personal relations, physical working conditions, salary, com­
pany policies, administrative practices, benefits and job
 
security.
 
The real motivators were factors which increased self­
3Hertzberg, Frederick, Mausner, Bernard, and Snyderman, Bock
 
Barbara; The Motivation to Work, John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,
 
New York, 1959.
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actualization or self-realization; a real sense of achievement,
 
recognition for these achievements, interesting and challdng­
ing work, a real sense of responsibility and the knowledge that
 
good work will lead to advancement. These factors were shown
 
to be'the most powerful positive motivators. The study also
 
showed that these same factors were not as strong on reducing
 
motivation. The strongest long-term negative motivators in­
cluded adverse company policies, incompetent technical super­
vision, inadequate salary and lack of recognition.
 
Authoritarian vs. Participative Management -- Douglas
 
McGregor defined a set of management characteristics that have
 
come to be known as participative management and labeled it
 
"theory YV as opposed to the usual authoritarian concept of
 
management which he labeled "theory X". The following are his
 
definitions of both theory X and theory Y:
 
"Theory X leads naturally to an emphasis on the.
 
tactics of control-to proceedures and technicues
 
for telling people what to do, for determining
 
whether they are doing it and for administering

rewards and punishments. People must be made to
 
do what is necessary."
 
"Theory Y... leads to a preoccupation with the
 
nature of relationships, with the creation of
 
an environment which will encourage committment
 
to organizational objectives and which will pro­
vide opportunities for maximum exercise of in- ­
itiative, ingenuity aid self-direction in achiev­
ing them." 
In a theory Y environment, each worker has much greater
 
opportunity to exercise intuition, judgment, and skill in the
 
4McGregor, Douglas, The Human Side of Enterprise, McGraw-Hill
 
Book Company, New York, 1960.
 
7A
 
performance of his task. 
His task is large enough and identi­
fiable enough so that he can take direct credit, or blame, for
 
his performance and that he can feel a real sense of belonging
 
to the team and that his contribution is important to the well­
being of his fellow workers and of the company.
 
More recently, Dr. Rensis Likert coordinated and compiled
 
very extensive studies over extended period of time to develop
 
a stable body of knowledge for management's use on how to
 
organize and run an enterprise.
 
The variables considered and the questions asked were much
 
too extensive to -reproduce here. However, the results were
 
found to form consistent sets of characteristics. Dr. Likert
 
Arranged these characteristics into systems: 5
 
System 1, Exploitative authoritative
 
System 2, Benevolent authoritative
 
System 3, Consultive
 
System 4, Participative.
 
With very few exceptions, high producing departments are
 
seen as using management systems toward system four and lower
 
producing companies as more toward system one.
 
In addition, these studies showed that most managers rely
 
on pressure to meet production goals and have the attitude that
 
an interest in their employees is a luxury.
 
Most managers report (and these studies proved) that,
 
when top management seeks to reduce costs, it shifts
 
its system more toward System one, i.e., toward a
 
5Likert, Rensis, The Human Organization, 
-McGraw-Hill Book Com­
pany, New York, 1967.
 
79
 
system which they know from their own observations
 
and experience yields poorer productivity and higher
 
costs, on the average and over the long run, than
 
does the existing management system of the company.6
 
This is exactly what the government agencies have done in
 
their attempts to reduce the costs of defense and aero-space
 
programs.
 
As he had anticipated, companies that really implemented
 
participative techniques, or more accurately a participative
 
environment (his system 4) showed significant improvement in
 
labor relations, end item quality, reduced costs, reduced em­
ployee turn-over and several other factors. Conversely, ad­
verse or dictatorial policies, such as extensive cost control,
 
explicit task definitions, having little or no room for initia­
five and excessive schedule pressure (his system 1) resulted.in
 
a marked degradation in these factors.
 
Another significant contribution to the management field
 
resulting from these studies was the amount of time required
 
for policy changes to become effective (either positively or
 
adversely). A full year was often required, for example, for
 
a-top management policy change to begin to effect the end pro­
7
 
duct.
 
The general environment in which defense industry employees
 
must work violates many of these basic characteristics. In the
 
author's experience, management emphasis has been on production
 
6Likert, p. 11
 
7Refer to page for a representative time table.
 
80
 
through job fragmentation and management pressure. The majority
 
of personnel involved with design and development activities
 
are not challenged by their jobs. They do not feel that they
 
are recognized as important members of the product team. And,
 
experience has taught them that their monetary rewards are much
 
more strongly influenced by the environmental factors beyond
 
their control, than by the amount or quality of work they per­
form. These are classic Theory X, or in Dr. Libert's terms,
 
systems one or systems two management characteristics. That
 
is, the authoritarian approach in which personnel are considered
 
to be machines that do what they are told to do as efficiently
 
as they can.
 
A shift in management emphasis toward McGregor's Theory Y
 
or Libert's System three and four, would help. However, so
 
many people are employed in the industry that if the program
 
is divided such that one task is assigned to each, little chal­
lenge or room for innovation and initiative would exist. Com­
puter technology will greatly aggravate this situation unless
 
the number of people assigned to a given program is greatly
 
reduced. As suggested in references 2 and 6, one capable,
 
motivated and trained individual working with the computer can
 
do much more-work, much more accurately and much faster than
 
several workers have been able to accomplish without the com­
puter. In addition, this one employee or small group of em­
ployees working as a team, would.feel greater self-satisfaction,
 
hence would, in the proper environment, become even more moti­
vated. In fact, George Steiner and William Ryan have found
 
81
 
that the few really effective program managers in'the defense
 
industries have such highly motivated employees that they work
 
9
 
too hard.

The Steiner/Ryan study also indicates the importance of
 
selecting good personnel, defining their responsibility as
 
broadly as possible, then giving them maximum possible freedom
 
to accomplish their tasks. However, since their study deals
 
primarily with the interface between the government contracting
 
agency and the contractor's-project manager, it will be refer­
enced in more detail in the next chapter.
 
The Effect of Computer Utilization on Personnel and Organiza­
tion.Structure
 
"The cybernation revolution has been brought about by
 
the combination of the computer and the automated self­
regulating machine. This results in a system of almost
 
unlimited productive capacity which requires progres­
sively less human labor. Cybernation is already re­
organizing the economy and social system to meet its
 
own needs." 1 0
 
These words were taken from a memorandum sent to President
 
Johnson in March 1964 by a group of west coast civic, academic
 
and industrial leaders who called themselves the Ad Hoc Commit­
tee on the Triple Revolution. In 1964, computer utilization
 
was limited to fewer applications and the critical factors for
 
extensive utilization (computer speed, cost and available soft­
.ware) were appreciably less attractive than they are now (see
 
9Steiner, George A, and Ryan, William G., 
Industrial Project
 
Management, The Macmillan Company, Toronto, 1968, p. 161.
 
1 0The Ad Hoc Committee on the Triple Revolution, "Triple Re­
volution," Advertising Age Magazine, April 6, 1964.
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Chapter III). Therefore, the concern expressed by the commit­
tee on the Triple Revolution are even more evident today.: The
 
economic and social system has been reorganized even further
 
toward meeting the needs of the cybernation revolution.11
 
No such thing as "the effect" exists because each industry
 
and each organization has reacted differently to the tools avail­
able. The subject has received sufficient attention in recent
 
literature, however, to provide a reasonably accurate feel for
 
the trends. Whether or not a particular organization has yet
 
to achieve a particular level of implementation is not parti­
cularly important. The main argument is that implemehtation
 
of.computer tools is inevitable. "By 1985 the computer will
 
have become central to the nervous system of the corporation."
1 2
 
Therefore, its effects must be understood and its utilization
 
carefully planned.
 
In a recent study of the effects electronic data proces­
sing has had on a "typical" user of computers, Charles W. Hofer
 
found a marked distinction in the consequences of computer use
 
levels of the organization. Top, or general management was
 
hardly effected, primarily because their function envolved
 
working with and evaluating people, not machines or products.
 
Middle, or functional management found their role to be
 
lone current study that indicates the extent to which one in­
dustry has been affected is Charles W. Hofer, "Emergency EDP
 
Pattern, Harvard Business Review, March-April 1970.
 
1 2Diebold, John, "Bad Decisions on Computer Use," Harvard
 
Business Review, January-February 1969, p. 15.
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somewhat modified. Greater need and a greater freedom to plan
 
ahead, as well as better data to work with, were the main
 
changes. The workers, or operational level personnel, es­
pecially in quantitative areas, felt the greatest changes.
 
The improved efficiency resulted in several of these groups
 
being combined, their scope of activity increased and the num­
ber of people required for a given task reduced as much as
 
1 3
 
40%.
 
Emphasis on the great effect computer systems eventually
 
have on personnel engaged in routine functions occurs very
 
frequently in the literature. The following example illus­
trates the point:
 
"While the computer extends the capabilities of the
 
creative person, ... it reduces or removes the need
 
for the engineer or designer who merely carries out
 
routine design activities using handbook-type data
 
according to preset rules. Of course, most of what
 
is 'designed' is done by this sort of 'skilled'
 
activity.n14
 
By the same token these computer tools provide the greatest op­
portunity for liberating mankind from the bondage of routine
 
ever occurred.15
 labor that has 

In a very comprehensive article dealing with the effects
 
of computer on organizations and management, Rober F. Vandell
 
13
Hofer, p. 16.
 
1 4Michael, Donald N., "The Unprepared Society: Planning for a
 
Precareous Future"
 
15
Diebold, John, Man and the Computer, Frederick A. Praeger,
 
New York, 1969, p. 137.
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presents his analysis of the basic areas of change. The fol­
16
lowing is an abbreviated summary of his observations:
 
1) Implementation of computer systems has two main
 
phases: First, a short term set-up phase, dominated by tech­
nical specialists, which is very expensive. This is followed
 
by the long operational phase conducted by line personnel for
 
which costs have been reduced substantially before preimplemen­
tation levels.
 
2) Decision making is much more rapid. More problems
 
are solved, faster and wity much less error. Most operational
 
decisions are delegated to the "front line" because they can
 
be more responsive and to free higher management for its in­
creased pressure to plan more carefully and in more detail.
 
3) Formal planning becomes the basis for action instead
 
of the pro forma exercise it has traditionally become. In
 
addition, management's skill, or art, for prediciting changes
 
is becoming increasingly important.
 
4) Strong pressures exist to reduce the size of the
 
company. Mr. Vandell stressed the need for responsiveness.
 
For a comprehensive analysis of other factors influencing the
 
trends in company size see Wittnebert's "Bigness vs Profit­
17
 
ability."
 
16Vandell, Robert F., "Management Evolution in the Quantita­
tive World," Harvard Business Review, January-February 1970,
 
pp. 83-92.
 
1 7Wittenbert, Fred R., "Bigness vs. Profitability," Harvard
 
Business Review, January-February 1970, p.' 158.
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*5) Top Management planning emphasis is shifting from
 
tactics to strategy.
 
As computer systems become cheaper and management becomes
 
more accustomed to its use, each manager's personal interaction
 
with the computer is expected to increase. The American Man­
agement Association has sponsored a continuing seminar on this
 
subject since 1964. The participants in this seminar expect
 
each manager to-eventually work directly with the computer as
 
a real-time extension of his brain. Mental processes specific­
ally named include postulating, judgement, analysis, logical
 
deduction, planning, forecasting, computing, interpalation,
 
18
 
interpretation and remembering. The argument is that the
 
computer can do many of these processes faster and more accu­
19
 
rately.
 
Obviously, the authors of the last study mentioned believe
 
that even top management will eventually be greatly effected
 
by computer tools. For this paper, however, direct interaction
 
between top management and the computer to the extent described
 
above is not considered. Major emphasis in the remainder of
 
the paper is limited to middle management and the working level
 
personnel where the greatest impact is currently being felt.
 
1 8Diebold, p. 15
 
19Sprague, Richard E., "Personalized Data Systems,!' Business
 
Automation, October 1969, pp. 43-51.
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Conclusion
 
Both of the forces discussed in this chapter (partfdipa­
tive management and computer utilization) have proven to be
 
very effective in reducing costs, improving the quality of
 
the end item and improving personnel morale and motivation.
 
Applied together they complement each other very well and
 
promise revolutionary changes. Many years of understanding,
 
dedicated and patient leadership will be required at all levels
 
of management both within the governmental agencies and with
 
contractor organizations before these tools and techniques
 
will be understood and implemented effectively. However, the,
 
research that has been conducted and-the experience of com­
panies, that have been utilizing these techniques provide a
 
sound basis to confirm that the end results are worth every
 
effort.
 
Chapter VI suggests a few policies and practices designed
 
to provide a better working environment and to initiate the
 
trend toward a system four type management.
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CHAPTER VI
 
THE PROGRAM INTEGRATION FUNCTION
 
The foregoing emphasis in this paper has been directed.
 
toward the identification of the factors that have resulted
 
in the familiar feast or famine nature of the industry, the
 
high cost of each program and the low employee morale. Key
 
factors that have been identified by a search of the litera­
ture include the size and duration of major contracts, crisis
 
schedule pressure, overcontrol by the responsible government
 
agencies, the basic disregard of human behavioral characteris­
tics and the development of computer technology.
 
Emphasis in this chapter is on the recommendation of
 
policies and practices to reverse these undesirable trends.
 
Particular emphasis is on the interface between the contract­
ing agency and the contractors.
 
Both the NASA and the DOD have taken positive steps to
 
relieve many of the problems attributable to contractural
 
responsibility for unanticipated technical difficulties. 1
 
.However, in the author's opinion, additional emphasis is re­
quired on the optimum size of each contract and on providing
 
a favorable environment for positive personnel motivation and
 
pride in their work.
 
Extensive research has been conducted by several teams
 
1National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Phased Project
 
Planning Guidelines, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washing­
ton, D. C., NHB 7121.2, 1968, p. 2-1.
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to identify the specific variables that consistently contri­
bute to successful programs. Success in this case, pertains
 
to completing the program successfully on schedule and within
 
the prescribed budget. Many of these variables have been in­
cluded elsewhere in this paper; However, a few have particu­
lar significance and are worth repeating as rationale, or
 
basic underlying reasons for the definition of the government's
 
role, the contractor's role and the demarkations between them.
 
These variables, or factors, are:
 
Holding the number of people having any connection
 
with the pro ram to the fewest required to complete
 
the program.
 
Mutual trust must exist between the government and
 
3
the contractors.

Huge, long-term contracts should be avoided.
 
The reasons for the latter has been a major theme through­
out this paper and is implicit in the proposition. One specific
 
technique for accomplishing this goal is described later in the
 
chapter.
 
Emphasis on holding the number of people associated with
 
the program to a minimum has also been a basic theme throughout
 
this paper. The following discussion, borrowed from Mr. Willian
 
B. McLean, expresses the reasons for this special emphasis very
 
well.
 
2Steiner, George A., 
and Ryan, William G., Industrial Project

Management, The Macmillan Company, Toronto, Ontario, 1968,
 
p. 33.
 
3Ibid, p. 64.
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As the working force passes the minimum number required
 
and the rate of progress slows down, the perceived need for
 
more people and more liaison increases rapidly. More engi­
neers'on the project can emient more avenues of approach and
 
more techniques to try. The maintenance of coordination be­
"tween all of these different possibilities becomes a function
 
which again requires more people and more paper work. Com­
petition for the available jobs becomes keen. Communications
 
begin to fall off. The understanding of what is to be ac­
complished becomes more remote. And, finally, the ability of
 
each engineer to participate in setting up the goals toward
 
which he is working, and his contribution to the total design
 
becomes less, with a resulting loss of interest.
 
Tension within such an overstaffed organization grows,
 
mistakes become more common, the trying of new things which
 
might lead to significant shortcuts becomes entirely too risky
 
and the designer eventually loses control of the organization.
 
On the other hand, the closeness of a small organization stimu­
lates continuous and rapid feedback between all stages of the
 
design process. Such feedback, provided by direct and rapid
 
communication, is essential if we are to achieve integrated
 
and functional designs. A small, effectife organization c&n
 
probably produce designs that are simpler and more reliable
 
by factors of from 10 to 100 over the kind of equipment that
 
results from thd straight-line process of starting with the
 
military requirement, building up a big organization and
 
C0
 
4

wading through countless, detailed specifications.

In the preceeding discussion, Mr. McLean stressed the
 
importance of maintaining the engineers' interest in the pro­
gram. Extensive research, discussed specifically in Chapter
 
V, has shown that program cost and quality are tied directly
 
to each individual's pride in his work supported by a partici­
pative or cooperative environment.
 
This research has also shown that the benefits of changes
 
in policies and practices toward a participative environment
 
come slowly. The attitudes and practices of many managers
 
at all levels must be changed before the individual workers
 
can be expected to change. This will require years of careful
 
training- and disciplined leadership by top management.
 
One way to get such a trend started is to carefully define
 
and then monitor and discipline the distinction between the
 
government's role and the contractor's role as defined below.
 
The following definitions of these respective roles also con­
tains the specific rationale, supported by-the earlier chapters,
 
for my hypothesis that the government should become its 
own
 
integrating contractor.
 
The Government's Role
 
Only the government has sufficient knowledge and authority
 
to define program objectives and to properly weigh the benefits
 
4McLean, William B., "The Art of Simple and Reliable Design,"

U.'S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, California,

1963, p. 6. Taken from Steiner, p. 34.
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to be derived from each of the major hardware alternatives tha
 
always arise during the definition and development phases of
 
a large scale program.
 
In order to reduce the potential for misunderstanding,
 
the question will be posed in terms of a specific, yet hy­
pothetical program. Assume the program-in question is to de­
sign, manufacture, test and operate a large, manned space sta­
tion. It is to operate in the near earth regionj support an
 
operational crew of 200 for at least 3 months without resupply
 
and have an operational life of at least 10 years.
 
Such a space station would be useful for many things that
 
can be defined in terms .of specific objectives ranging from
 
the development and testing of subsystems and techniques suit­
able for extended space flights to neighboring planets to the
 
improvement of the biosphere by spotting and monitoring con­
tamination sources and trends.
 
An exact list of possible objectives is not important to
 
this argument. The important consideration is that the list
 
will always be changing. If a contract were awarded to opti­
mize the design of a spacecraft for a specific set of objectives
 
as they exist today, many of these objectives have been replaced
 
by a new set before the hardware could be manufactured, thereby,
 
inducing hardware changes. it is also important to assure that
 
all hardware required is within the state-of-the-art.5 Speci­
fic sensors, computer facilities, maneuvering capability, life
 
5NASA, NHB 7121.2, p. 5-1.
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support systems, communication systems, crew mix, everything
 
except perhaps the basic structure could be expected to change
 
during the spacecraft's operation life as new needs and new
 
technological capabilities develop.
 
Attempting to anticipate this entire sequence with suf­
ficient accuracy to permit selection of one prime or inte­
grating contractor for the entire 15 or 20 year span of the
 
program would be unrealistic. A realistic contract could be
 
awarded for the development and integration of the first com­
plement of equipment required to meet known objectives with
 
certain provisos. For example, the vehicle should be main­
6
tainable by onboard field level personnel (non-astronauts).
 
and the basic structure must be designed such tat all subsys­
tems could be replaced as modular units, including all wiring
 
and plumbing. Then, the government could award separate con­
tracts later for new sensor packages, engines, environmental
 
control systems or whatever required to meet the changing needs.
 
In order for the responsible government agency to intel­
ligently award these follow-on contracts, it must be able to
 
conduct thorough operations analysis to determine which areas
 
to change and how each should be changed to meet a new set of
 
objectives. They must have current knowledge of the state-of­
the-art. They must have qualified program control, systems
 
6Donald K. Slayton, Director of Flight Crew Operations, Manned
 
Spacecraft Center, Houston, Texas, suggested to the author on
 
February 12, 1970, that a large space station would probably
 
be manned by technicians and scientists, not astronauts.
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analysis, design engineering, industrial engineering and opera­
tions groups to prepare specifications, award and administer
 
contracts, provide technical assistance, operate and maintain
 
the new subsystems.
 
Now the-question becomes when should the government begin
 
to award separate contracts for each subsystem module.
 
When should the government become its own integrating con­
tractor?
 
As discussed in previous chapters, in order to save the
 
cost of compounding profits through tiers of subcontractors,
 
to reduce the manpower fluctuations that normally accompany
 
the awarding of a major contract and to scale the financial
 
risks associated with inadequate management on the part of the
 
contractor to levels that would hurt, but not bankrupt the
 
company suggest that the government should assume the role of
 
integrating contractor as soon as practical. Obviously, it is
 
not that simple. First the government agencies must prepare
 
by staffing and training personnel for new disciplines; by
 
developing computer data banks and the mechanism for keeping
 
the data complete and current; by developing policies, pro­
cesses and procedures for operating in this new mode and by
 
educating the industry and the-public on the agencies intentions
 
and the reasons behind these intentions.
 
The Contractor's Role
 
Implicit in the foregoing section on the government's role
 
was the assumption that the government would not want to.manu­
facture any of the spacecraft hardware with the exception of a
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few unique, minor items. Hardware contractors have an exper­
tise in the whole field of industrial engineering that is al­
most totally lacking in most government agencies. In addition,
 
the magnitude of the manufacturing task for any given large
 
program is much greater than the government could accommodate
 
inhouse, even with computer tools, without imposing the tre­
mendous surge of manpower that this paper is explicitly trying
 
to reduce.
 
Hardware contractors have another advantage not shared
 
by the contracting agency. It can intersperse jobs from other
 
government programs or from the commercial market and thereby
 
maintain stable employment, providing that none of these con­
tracts is too large. By awarding hugh prime contracts, the
 
government destroys this stable balance because massive hiring
 
campaigns are required-to meet the tremendous program scope
 
within the schedule commitments.
 
Effective utilization of each contractor's manufacturing
 
expertise implies that he should select hiw own vendors, pre­
pare his own manufacturing drawings, and employ his own tech­
niques for obtaining maximum reliability and quality for mini­
mum weight and volume. In addition to the technical and
 
economic sense of making maximum advantage of each contractor's
 
special skills, there is the human motivation goal of providing
 
each worker with sufficient "elbow room" to exercise his, crea­
tivity, to feel like a real member of the team and to enjoy the
 
discipline of specific personal responsibility. These argu­
ments suggest.that most contracts should be for at least complete
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assemblies and preferably for complete subsystems, but not for
 
complete programs.
 
Demarcations between the Government and Contractor's Role
 
One of the points mentioned in Chapter II was the separa­
tion of the government's role as a customer and its role as a
 
technical advisor. With the crisis schedule pressures of
 
World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Cold War
 
and the Space Race, this distinction was greatly reduced.
 
Government contracting agencies felt that they must assure
 
technical success by monitoring and advising the contractor on
 
every step during the program. Much of this assistance per­
formed its intended function and did result in a better product.
 
However, the cost in dollars and human motivation was very high.
 
The main theme of this chapter is that the desired bene­
fits that caused such close control by the government can be
 
achieved for much smaller cost by not only separating the
 
government and the contractors roles but also by separating
 
the government's role into three separate and distinct func­
tions: planning, program management and technical assistance.
 
Program Planning -- Program planning is absolutely es­
.sential. As mentioned earlier, several authors have stressed
 
that the increased complexity and faster pace imposed on in­
dustrial society by the "quantitative revolution" has forced
 
a premium on serious, thorough, viable planning as never before.
 
Many organizations hav& had long range planning groups for some
 
time. For many organizations, however, these groups have been,
 
in fact, pro forma units staffed frequently by high level
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personnel no one else wanted and which had essentially no ef­
fect on the real future of the organization.
7
 
The real action planning was done by each line manager in­
aependent of a central planning group. The pace of most pro­
grams was such that these managers could implement their plans
 
incrementally toward some poorly defined goal. If one of these
 
incremental decisions proved to be inadequate, and if the in­
adequacy was discovered before too long, it could be corrected
 
with relatively little impact. If it was not discovered until
 
after the hardware had been built, correction was required on
 
a crisis basis to prevent the entire program from slipping
 
schedule.
 
Computer-technology can greatly help avoid these problems
 
by facilitating the planning itself and the integration of each
 
line manager's plans into an overall program plan. These tools
 
can also, however, result in much greater cost penalties for
 
a given time to find and correct errors because the equipment
 
design and manufacturing-phases will be so much shorter. For
 
example, a few years ago, a one month delay in discovering an
 
error would have been relatively inexpensive because the design
 
would not have progressed very much farther. The error could
 
be corrected with only a paper change. In a few more years,
 
however, the equipment will have been designed and manufactured
 
in a month.
 
Another important aspect of planning related to the objec­
7Steiner, George A.; Top' Management Planning, The Macmillian
 
Company, Toronto, Ontario,-1969, p. 8.
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tive of this paiper is to provide a uniform flow of contracts,
 
as opposed to the current tendency to award several hugh con­
tracts at nearly the same time, then to wait another eight to
 
ten years before awarding another series. To do this, the
 
government will need a long range integrated plan so that
 
needed technological developments can be anticipated, and de­
velopment contracts awarded prior to the need for the hardware.
 
Opinions vary as to the length of lead time required for
 
this planning. One prominent author suggests that five years
 
8
 
is too short for the aerospace industry. Other argue that
 
computer technology combined with the solid base of knowledge
 
now existing in most disciplines permit new developments to
 
be achieved almost on demand. In any event, we tend to be too
 
limited in that we only consider the state-of-technology at
 
the moment of review. Long range planners need to monitor the
 
signals to anticipate and lead developments so that they will
 
be ready when needed.
9
 
These arguments pertain primarily to the technical prob­
lems involved. However, increasing evidence indicates that
 
the problem is now philosophical, not technical. Long lead
 
times are required to obtain the required public, political and
 
administrative support in time to allow hardware contracts to
 
be awarded.
 
8lbid, p. 26.
 
9Bright, James R., 
"Evaluating Signals of Technological Change,
 
Harvard Business Review, January-February 1970, p. 70.
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Program Management -- The intent of both the NASA and the
 
DOD procurement and program management manuals is to free the
 
10
 
contractor to make decisions without undue interference.

This implies control by specification, standards as well as
 
It is not intended that contract­schedule and cost budgets. 

ing 	agencies permit their technical experts to tell, or even
 
advise, the contractor how to accomplish these requirements.
 
The main reasons given in the literature for tightening
 
government program management control of contractors are:
 
1) 	A desire of government personnel to participate
 
in all program decisions, hence they desire ever
 
increasing quantities of data.
 
2) 	A desire to stimulate a competitive environment.
 
A desire to reduce cost without schedule or
3) 
 II
 
performance loss.
 
Unfortunately, no counterbalancing forces exist other than the
 
limited protests by the contractor. Therefore, an artificial
 
counterforce must be provided. Perhaps the best and most
 
straight forward method is a clear statement and strict en­
forcement of policy in which the respective responsibilities
 
are defined.
 
The program management function was described in greater
 
detail in Chapter IV. The primary difference between the
 
government program manager's function and that of his industrial
 
counterparts can be implied by their respective interpretations
 
1 0Steiner and Ryan, p. 79.
 
1tIbid, pp. -71-72
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of the term "system." To the government program manageri the
 
system refers to all vehicles, ground facilities and other
 
equipment and personnel required to accomplish the program ob­
jective. To a given contractor program manager, the system
 
usually refers to his particular end item.
 
Technical Advisors-
 All technical direction to contractors
 
ought to be through changes in the specifications (hence the
 
contract). A strong governmental technical staff is crucial
 
to intelligent specification of specific performance require­
ments for each contract. These specialists are also needed to
 
assist the contractors in areas where they are having technical
 
difficulties and ask for assistance, or in areas where special
 
facilities are required that are impractical for each contrac­
tor to procure and maintain (large thermo-vacuum chambers for
 
example).
 
Government technical specialists should not be permitted
 
to tell the contractor how to design the equipment he has 
con­
tracted to build. Several problems result if this is allowed.
 
Costs increase because these directions frequently require re­
design or -rework. Whether the cost is borne by the government
 
or by the contractor is irrelevent. The argument is simply
 
that these are unnecessary costs. If the contractor's design
 
does not meet the specification for which it was contracted it
 
might be necessary to formally direct a change. However, this
 
is a default of contract items that must be decided by the
 
government's program manager.
 
Another argument against permitting government technical
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people from directing, or even suggesting how a design should
 
be implemented is that even government technical specialists
 
that have no direct connection with the program management­
function represent the customer to the contractor, that is,
 
the contractor's employees will tend to fear sanctions of some
 
sort if he does not do as the government technical specialist
 
implies. This could cause the contractor's designer to change
 
or compromise his design even though he is not in technical
 
agreement. The result is a frustrated designer and perhaps a
 
suboptimal design.
 
Preventing government technical specialists from telling
 
the contractors how to design will be increasingly difficult
 
with computer aided design and well-supplied data banks. He
 
might very well be totally capable of designing a better pro­
duct than the-contractor's design engineer. Occasionally,
 
however, a technically optimum design might require modifica­
tion to permit practical manufacturing, or to achieve greater
 
reliability. Since-the government's design engineer is usually
 
not intimately familiar with the contractor's manufacturing
 
techniques and capabilities he cannot accurately second guess
 
his contractor counterpart.
 
One technique to prevent this potential conflict would be
 
to implicitly define policy against it. Then, conduct an ex­
tensive training program to make all government personnel aware
 
of the financial and personnel morale implications of their
 
interference.
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CHAPTER VII
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
 
The defense industry has been notorious for its feast-or­
famine nature. This tradition began during World War II and
 
increased in intensity with each of several abrupt changes in
 
defense policy. These changes resulted in shifting contractor
 
requirements such that activity in portions of the industry
 
would decrease rapidly and other portions would accelerate
 
under heavy schedule pressure to meet the highly sophisticated
 
technological needs of the newest crisis. Each of these factor
 
contributed to greatly increased program costs. High costs, in
 
turn, tended to cause increased government control which also
 
added to both pressure and cost.
 
To break this divergent series, Robert S. McNan'ara in­
troduced the "total package" concept in the early 1960's in
 
which one contractor is responsible for all aspects of a given
 
program.from inception to operational support on essentially
 
a fixed-price contract. Unfortunately neither the Department
 
of Defense nor the contractors knew how to manage such an ar­
rangement. Proposal costs became prohibitive for all but the
 
largest companies and the risks associated with the hugh, long.
 
duration, fixed price contracts were potentially greater than
 
any one company could accommodate. As a result, many of the
 
defense and spacecontractors find it increasingly difficult
 
to continue as a research and development contractor exclu­
sively for the government.
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During the last few years, both the Department of Defense
 
and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration have modi­
fled their procurement practices to reduce the contractor's
 
risk. However, much still needs to be done to reduce the cost
 
of these programs even further and to greatly improve the morale
 
and self-esteem of the employees.
 
In his book entitled, Space Age Management, the former
 
administrator of the NASA, James E. Webb wrote:
 
There is no doubt that we have the technological tools
 
to free our society of many of its burdens and to car­
ry it to new levels of achievement. What we need is
 
an operating concept that requires us to find ways to
 
use these tools deliberately and purposefully to re­
form our society and to assure continued progress
 
toward the greater goals we set for ourselves long
 
1
ago.

Two major technical tools having sufficient power and ap­
plicability to "free our society" are computer technology and
 
human behavioral characteristics.
 
Computer Technology -- Computers, and the computers abil
 
ity to generate, store, manipulate and communicate knowledge
 
is producing a prodigious rate of change in almost every as­
pect-of program management. Personnel at all levels are gain­
ing real time access to an.every increasing supply of -informa­
tion and an ever increasing variety of tools through the use
 
of remote terminals and computer time sharing.
 
-A real appreciation for the impact potential of these
 
tools can be obtained by examining the increase in the
 
Webb, James E., Space Age Management, McGraw-Hill, Inc., New
 
York, 1969, p. 25.
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1
computer's fundamental variable, its central processing speed.
 
In the mid 1940's, the first general purpose digital computer
 
could add or subtract at the rate of 3 additions per second.
 
The newest computers are capable of conducting several of these
 
operations simultaneously, each at a rate of approximately a
 
billion per second. A billionth of a second is to a second
 
as a second is to thirty years.
 
This is not to say that additional advancements in com­
puter technology will not be useful. However, the major needs
 
now are for even greater speed and increased random access
 
memory storage capacity to further reduce cost. One authority
 
recognized by the authors of Business Automation (Frederic G.
 
Withington of Arthur-D. Little, Inc.) predicts that by 1975
 
there will be a five-fold increase in circuit speed with cor­
responding drops i-n cost ranging from 10 to 50 percent of the
 
present costs. Memory storage capacity is expected to have an
 
improvement in cost-performance of 10 fold., using rotating
 
magnetic disks devices offering as many as-one billion bytes
 
of storage capacity, with 50 millisecond random access.
 
The existing capacity and speed of these devices is al­
ready transforming the computer from a tool for specific tech­
nical applications to a general purpose management tool with
 
almost limitless application.
 
As a result, all levels of management are in a very dif­
ficult transition period. For many organizations, the com­
petitive pressure from the market place, the zealous enthusiasm
 
of the computer services companies and the lack of adequate
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training, planning and preparation of its personnel has lead,
 
or will lead, to an expensive fiasco. However, the trends are
 
clear. Many leading business consultants predict that in order
 
to obtain the rapid response necessary to adapt to changing
 
markets, new information and a changing economic and social
 
environment, all levels of management must adapt to these tools
 
to survive.
 
In companies that have begun serious use.of computers,
 
top management are devoting every increasing time and energy
 
to strategic planning by combining their experfence with the
 
information stored in data banks. They are delegating the
 
tactical planning that had required so much of their time to
 
middle management-.
 
Middle management is no longer required to devote the
 
majority of his time to assuring that the operations level are
 
doing their work because their output is readily available
 
through computer processed production and status reports.
 
Therefore, they have more time and greater need to plan, con­
duct trade-off studies, and integrate the work of their em­
ployees.
 
Operations level personnel, of course, have received the
 
greatest impact from the utilization of-computer tools. Nearly
 
all of the routine functions that have required large numbers
 
of personnel to perform can now be conducted much faster,
 
cheaper and more accurately by the computer. Recent studies
 
have shown that up to,40 percent-fewer personnel are required
 
to perform the same quantitative tasks.
 
Human Behavior Characteristics and Organizational Efficiency --

Thousands of employees are hired during the course of large de­
fense and space programs that are not really needed. These
 
people are hired in the rush to find enough qualified personnel
 
-to support the schedule requirements, to accommodate peak de-­
mands and to have a reserve for contingincies. The industry
 
wide philosophy for meeting any contingency has been to assign
 
a lot of people to solve the problem.
 
,Since the government paid all expenses, plus a steep over­
head charge for most of the advanced programs, contractors were
 
motivated to hire as many people as they could. In fact, in
 
the interest of meeting tight schedule requirements, the govern­
ment frequently encouraged the contractors to hire even more
 
personnel than they wanted.
 
As-described in Chapter V, these excess personnel were
 
worse than useless. They introduced unnecessary work, plugged
 
communication channels and spread discontentment because they
 
were frequently bored. Each employee was frequently faced with
 
policies and practices that allowed little discretion, highly
 
fragmented job assignments that provided little room for in­
itiative and a reward structure based on longevity and favori­
tism instead of contribution to the organization's goals.
 
Excess personnel are not only expensive for the govern­
ment. As the program nears completion and these people are
 
laid-off, they must move to a new job. Research for the De­
partment of Labor has shown-that the average cost of such a
 
move (for aerospace industry personnel) is half a years
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salary per move. This includes no allowance for the personal
 
feelings associated with insecurity and uprooting his family
 
every few years.
 
Cohtractor personnel problems have been further complicated
 
by all the "help" they received from government personnel.
 
Typically, government personnel implicitly assumed that sched­
ule did not allow the luxury of permitting contractor personnel
 
to make mistakes, that two (or more) heads are better than one,
 
and that contractor personnel will not perform unless they are
 
pushed.
 
These factors provide a discouraging work environment
 
that destroys the job interest, motivation and self-esteem of
 
contractor personnel at all levels. Substantial research on
 
basic human characteristics and motivation factors in an in­
dustrial environment have shown conclusively that the cost and
 
quality of a company's end items is a strong function of the
 
morale and self-esteem of its personnel. Fortunately, the
 
techniques that result in the most productive employee are
 
consistent with the natural development and well being of the
 
individual.
 
Therefore, the policies and practices proposed for the
 
administration of future large science programs must consider
 
management techniques to improve personnel motivation and to
 
hold-the total number of personnel (both government and con­
tractor) allowed to have anything to do with the program to
 
a minimum.
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Hugh prime contracts also present a burden from the point
 
of view of contractor personnel efficiency. The ideal contract
 
load for a given company would provide steady growth and stable
 
employment. Key personnel would know each other, communication
 
channels would be well established, lines and levels of author­
ity would be well understood and the organization would perform
 
as an efficient team.
 
Hugh contracts destroy this balance by requiring the rapid
 
addition of tens of thousands of new personnel to the organi­
zational structure. The result is an inefficient organization
 
for the first several years as competent management personnel
 
are selected, lines of communication established and a working
 
team developed. About this time the development phase for the
 
program nears Completion and the-team begins to disperse. Then
 
the cycle begins again on a new program for another company.
 
Consequently, huge programs tend to result in an inefficient­
organizational structure for the most of the developmental phase
 
of the program. This argument suggests that contracts should
 
be within the individual companies' existing capability without
 
requiring more than a small percentage of additional personnel.
 
Bigness vs. Profitability -- Industrial giants are finding
 
it increasingly difficult to compete with smaller companies on
 
items for which the demand and the price are determined by the
 
commercial market place. The reasons for this shifting advan­
tage can be grouped into two general categories; increasing
 
public resentment of industry in general and the consequences
 
of ponderous corporate hierarchies.
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Large companies are more susceptible to general public
 
resentment than smaller companies because they are so much
 
more visible. This pressure is manifest in -several ways such
 
as government antitrust actions, trade embargoes -and union de­
mands.
 
Smaller companies are not only less susceptible to ex­
ternal interference, they are also much more responsive to
 
change and permit greater individual freedom because they are
 
not hampered by hugh hierarchies. Also, the advent of com­
puter time-sharing, has not only given the small company the
 
use of the computer that was for so long one of the advantages
 
of size, the small company can make more effective use of the
 
computer time it buys.
 
The Program Integration Function -- The unique role of 
the government in the management of large public science pro­
grams is to develop the program objectives and the performance 
capabilities required.- The unique tasks for which contractors 
are needed include the detailed design, manufacture and test 
activities required for each end item. A major task in between 
these functions that could be performed by either is that of 
general program integration. Program integration includes the
 
preparation of common design and manufacturing standards, the
 
preparation of detailed performance and interface specification
 
for each suplement that is to be contracted for separately, de­
velopment of the overall program plan, integration of hardware
 
development schedules, configuration and change control, and
 
assuring that all elements of the program fit together mechani­
cally and functionally.
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The National Aeronautics and Space Administration has
 
demonstrated that government agencies can perform most of the
 
functions very well. In addition, increasedutilization of
 
computer technology could greatly enhance the quality of these
 
efforts while reducing the total number of personnel and the
 
time required. Equally important, computer use could greatly
 
facilitate control and integration of the program as it pro­
gressed.
 
Conclusions
 
Without sacrificing the number of programs, or the quality
 
of their respective hardware, government agencies can signifi­
cantly reduce the cost of large scale public science programs
 
to be consistent with the demands of the nation's changing
 
social and economic environment. Computer technology and basic
 
human motivation characteristics are the tools. The major de­
terrents to the utilization of these tools are phychological
 
and philosophical, nottechnical.
 
Emphasis in defense and space contracts has been on tech­
nical superiority and schedule too long to enable a rapid tran­
sition to adequate hardware performance for the least cost.
 
The transition will be particularly difficult for management
 
personnel. It will require more explicit planning and per­
sistent discipline in execution than any of these managers have
 
-experienced in previous programs.
 
:The notions that large public hardware programs require
 
massive numbers of people and that these people will only per­
form well under heavy external pressure are deeply. ingrained
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in the minds of many managers both within the government and
 
within the defense and-space industry contractors. In addition,
 
the notion that government personnel are not capable of per­
forming as effectively as personnel in private industry is also
 
widely held. These notions are no longer true, or at least they
 
need not be. They are primarily a result of tradition, a general
 
lack of appreciation for how to establish a truly creative, ef­
fective and efficient working environment and a lack of manage­
ment courage and discipline at all-levels.
 
Even if top management fully understood and agreed with
 
the concepts presented herein and knew exactly how to implement
 
these changes, research has shown that several years would prob­
ably be required for these policies and practices to become ef­
fective. Therefore, the author's recommendation is that the
 
first step should be to provide a government/contractor inter­
face that would be conducive to these ends. Then, capability
 
for effective utilization of computer technology should be
 
developed for each major program function. And finally, con­
tracts should be limited to specific portions of the overall
 
program such that each can be readily accomplished within the
 
winning contractor's-existing capability.
 
Recommendations
 
Management of large programs is, of course, a very complex
 
task in which public policy, program objectives, technical com­
plexity, size, organizational elements, quality of personnel
 
and management personalities are all important variables. The­
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Nation's social and economic environment can be reflected in
 
all of these areas. However, this paper is somewhat normative
 
in that ways to reduce the cost of major programs and improve
 
the well-being of the individual employee are presented without
 
considering the effects of these variables.
 
The specific recommendations from this study are limited
 
to the macroscopic policies and the governmental organization
 
structure required to provide an environment that is conducive
 
to low cost and high productivity. Although very important,
 
the day-to-day operating policies and personnel relations are
 
beyond the scope of this effort.
 
Three specific recommendations are offered:
 
- that the government separate its program management
 
function and its function as technical advisor.
 
- that the government establish a strong, central
 
organizational unit in the Program Control area
 
to plan, coordinate and control the use of computer
 
related equipment throughout the program.
 
- that the government become its own integrating
 
contractor such that a continuing stream of smaller
 
contracts can be awarded throughout the life of the
 
program.
 
The major reasons for separating the technical advisor
 
function from program management per se are to prevent govern­
ment technical personnel from exerting too much influence over
 
the contractors technical efforts'and to provide an academic
 
environment in which the government experts primary responsi­
bility is to become the best in their respective specialties.
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-AS such they would be able to assist private ihdustry, or other
 
government agencies, whenever their technical expertise was
 
needed. This technique will permit (and require) each con­
tractor to be totally responsible for the performance of its
 
technical and its management teams. However, in the event that
 
it really gets stuck technically, it can turn to the government
 
technical advisors for aid.
 
The basic concept is to control each contractor by speci­
fication and contract rather than by close supervision.
 
A central unit to control computer use is important because
 
of the great potential for misuse. These tools are simply too
 
expensive to permit their use to be uncontrolled. Such a con­
trol unit must also be separated from the technical areas,
 
especially from the computer use center where the computers
 
tend to become ends rather than means. Program contol is sug­
gested as the ideal location for this unit as it is the only
 
area in which the relative cost (or savings) of a particular
 
computer application can be assessed relative to its value to
 
the overall program.
 
Several benefits could be derived by having the government
 
agencies become their own integrating contractor. Obsiously
 
the problems associated with huge, long term contracts would
 
be avoided because no such contracts would be needed. Smaller
 
contracts can be much more easily managed because the cost
 
incentivies can be realistic and because the task to be per­
formed can be more easily specified. In addition-, the govern­
ment would have the flexibility to award separate contracts for
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follow on subsystems as they are needed for new program ob­
jectives.
 
Additional Comments
 
This paper has defined only an overall policy objective
 
and a few specific mechanisms for developing an environment in
 
which these objectives have a chance to be accomplished.
 
Much more effort must be devoted to specific plans for
 
implementing these mechanisms. Personnel must be trained and
 
the entire Concept reviewed, discussed and sold to management
 
personnel within the government and within the industry before
 
anything can be accomplished. These steps are being taken by
 
those industries in which the commercial market place demands
 
maximum efficiency and effectiveness for survival. Competition
 
is becoming even less forgiving as computer technology and human
 
motivation concepts become operational tools in the managers'
 
kit.
 
Defense and space programs are now, for the first time since
 
World War II, entering a competitive environment similar to that
 
faced by private industry. One major difference is that agen­
cies such as the Department of Defense and the National Aero­
nautics and Space Administration have but one customer - the
 
Public. And this customer is served indirectly through the
 
Executive and the Congress. Therefore, in a way, the managers
 
of these agencies have a much more difficult task than their
 
industrial counterparts. The only alternatives available in
 
lieu of more money are to drastically reduce the number and
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scope of programs, or to become considerably more efficient.
 
The fundamental theme for this paper has been that the latter
 
would be the only acceptable course of action if it could be
 
accomplished. Research on the basic reasons for inefficiency
 
in defense and space programs; on the current status of compu
 
technology and on basic human motivation characteristics has
 
convinced the author that a great deal can be done to reduce
 
program costs. However, the techniques for achieving these
 
cost reductions require basic philosophical changes in the way
 
the government has conducted its program management business
 
in recent years.
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